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"[A] colored worker who is denied the protection and the benefits
of organized labor because they will not take him in, has only one
place of redress in case his right of employment is assailed, and that
is in our courts."
Harry E. Davis, Member, Ohio House of Representatives, 19281
"[I]nstead of taking the part of the Negro and helping him toward
physical and economic freedom, the American labor movement
from the beginning has tried to achieve freedom at the expense of
the Negro."
W.E.B. Du Bois, 1929
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INTRODUCTION

The demise of the laissez-faire jurisprudence of the Lochner era' in
the late 1930s and early 1940s came at a most inopportune time for

3. The Lochner era, named after the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), lasted from approximately 1897 to 1937. CompareAllgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897) (propounding expansive definition of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in context of economic regulation) awth West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(abandoning Lochner scrutiny and upholding minimum wage legislation). During this period,
the Supreme Court engaged in relatively strict scrutiny of the constitutionality of state and
federal economic regulation.
The term "Lochner era" is a misnomer. Most of the important cases involving invalidation of
federal regulation during this period revolved around issues of federalism and strict construction
of the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, not, as in Lochnerand other
cases involving state regulation, the issue of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due
process.
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black Americans. Federal labor law and policy of the 1930s cartelized
the labor market on behalf of racist labor unions, while black workers
remained unprotected by civil rights legislation. Lochnerian judicial
intervention to protect free labor markets could have saved hundreds
of thousands, perhaps millions of blacks from being permanently
deprived of their livelihoods. After a short-lived struggle by the Old
Court,4 however, no such intervention was forthcoming.'
The long-term effects of judicial acquiescence to New Deal labor
legislation linger today in the form of persistently high rates of black
unemployment and the emergence of a marginalized "underclass."6
During the Lochner era, courts had a particular antipathy to labor7
legislation that directly or indirectly benefited labor unions.
Scholars have traced the roots of this hostility to abolitionist "free
labor" ideology,8 as well as to the Jacksonian antimonopoly tradi-

4. The term "Old Court" refers to the New Deal Supreme Court before 1937.
5. The Lochnereracollapsed in the 1930s. See, ag,Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding government regulation of grain raised for family consumption); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (upholding legislation that banned discrimination based on labor
union affiliation); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (announcing
dichotomy between fundamental civil liberties and economic rights); NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (affirming regulation of labor practices through Commerce
Clause power); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage
legislation); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding milk price control
regulations).
6. Michael Harrington coined this unfortunate term. See MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE
OTHER AMERICA 6-7 (1960) (describing underclass as neglected and forgotten members of
society); see also infranotes 329-49 and accompanying text (discussing creation of underclass as
result of New Deal legislation).
7. Se, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,553 (1923) (striking down minimum
wage law for women); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38-44 (1922) (declaring tax
on child labor invalid); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915) (finding state law
prohibiting employers from forbidding employees from joining labor unions violative of
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 163 (1908)
(striking down legislation forbidding employer discrimination against union members); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (determining that law limiting total work hours for bakers
interfered with constitutionally protected liberty interest of freedom of contract between
employer and employee); see alsoJOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME
COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 430-31 (1978) (noting Supreme Court's
"hostility to union activity" and to "laws that encouraged unionism"); WILLIAM M. WIECE,
LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 121 (1988) (observing that
Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts "distrusted labor organizations"). The Lochner
era courts' bias against pro-union legislation was even more evident in the lower federal courts
and the state courts. See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement 102
HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1237-56 apps. A-C (1989) (listing legislative goals of labor movement and
cases on those issues).
8. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, FreeLabor, the Consumerlnteres and the Law of IndustrialDisputs,
1885-1900, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 19, 19 (1992) (stating that judges of Lochner era acted to
"uphold a system of values which they termed the free labor system"); William E. Forbath, The
Ambiguities of Free Labor Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 767, 782-86
(noting courts' reliance on "free labor" ideology). The key to the ideology of antislavery activists
was that a person should be allowed to sell his labor in a free market. See ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERIcA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 67 (1988) [hereinafter FONER,
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tion.9 Judges adhering to both intellectual traditions believed that
labor unions were a threat to liberty because they attempted to
monopolize the labor market for the benefit of their members and to
the detriment of other workers.' °
While the benign intentions of Lochner era judges are widely
recognized today," legal scholars such as Laurence Tribe and Cass

RECONSTRUCTION] (discussing broad debate over whether slaves should be permitted to enter
free labor market). For a succinct judicial statement of this free labor ideology, see Butchers'
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746,757 (1884) (Field,J., concurring) ("The property
which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so
it is the most sacred and inviolable.").
9. Radical libertarian Jacksonians, known as loco-focos, abhorred "class legislation" that
conferred special legal privileges on powerful interest groups. See generally WILLJAM LEGGETF,
DEMOCRATICK EDITORIALS: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (Lawrence White ed.,
1984) (presenting collection of essays by prominent loco-foco); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE
JACKSONIAN ERA 95, 103 (1959) (describing emergence of loco-focoism and its opposition to any
form of monopoly). This strand ofJacksonianism contributed to the emergence of laissez-faire
jurisprudence. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 33-60 (1993) (discussing Jacksonian origins of laissez-faire
jurisprudence); Michael L Benedict, Laissez-Faireand Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaningand
OrginsofLaissez-FaireConstitutionalism,3 L. & HIST. REv. 293,297 (1985) (recognizingJacksonian
origins of doctrines of laissez-faire constitutionalism and describing Jacksonian influence on
laissez-faire jurisprudence); Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legilation, and Sex
Discrimination: One Small CheerforMr.HerbertSpencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1366,1367
(1990) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. FROM POLmcAL
PRINCIPLE TOJUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)) (noting that framers of Civil War Amendments relied
inconsistently on principles of natural law, Jacksonianism, states' rights, and federalism).
10. Both ideologies were also consistent with prevalent classical economic theory. Benedict,
supranote 9, at 305-06 (explaining that classical economic theory complemented laissez-faire
political and legal theory by disfavoring government economic regulation); James May, Antitrust
in theFormativeEra:PoliticalandEconomic Theoy in ConstitutionalandAntitustAnalysis,1880-1918,
50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257, 269 (1989) (describing relationship between political and economic
theory). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40
STAN. L. REV. 379, 380 (1988) (linking economic theory supporting right to contract and
political view of individual liberties guaranteed under Due Process Clause).
For an example of the complexity of laissez-faire jurisprudential thought, see David N. Mayer,
TheJurisprudenceof ChristopherG. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failureof Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism,
55 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1990) (describing intellectual development of leading nineteenth-century
libertarian legal scholar).
11. See supra notes 8-10. Until recently, most legal scholars and historians incorrectly
attributed the origins of laissez-faire jurisprudence to the influence of "Social Darwinism." Se,
e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 36 (2d ed. 1980); PAUL BREST &
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 228 (2d ed. 1983); RICHARD
HOFsTADER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 5-6 (rev. ed. 1955); CLYDE E.JACOBS, LAW
WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS E. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN,
AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1954); PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL
POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LomBNER V. NEW YORK 5 (1990); ARNOLD M.
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895,
at 236 (1960); BENJAMIN TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITrTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO
THE SUPREME COURT 154 (1942).
Social Darwinism actually had minimal influence on American laissez-faire liberal thought,
inside or outside legal circles. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BANNISTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM: SCIENCE AND
MYTH IN ANGLO-AMERICAN THOUGHT 58-60 (1979) (stating that few laissez-faire liberals based
beliefs on Social Darwinism); THOMAS F. GOSSET, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA
168-75 (1963) (asserting that liberals recognized need of man to survive by cooperating with his
fellow man rather than through power struggles); DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE
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Sunstein continue to criticize them for allegedly adhering to
old-fashioned ideologies that had little relevance to the problems
facing an industrializing nation and its citizens. 12 According to
critics, by preventing the government from aiding labor unions, the
Lochner era courts implicitly sided with wealthy capital at the expense
of helpless labor.1 Other scholars, such as Derrick Bell, add that
black Americans were most in need of the labor protection that the
courts denied to workers. 4

PROGRESSIVES 18-22 (1968) (explaining that progressives were primary purveyors of Social
Darwinist ideology); cf.JOHN GRAY, LIBERALiSMS: EssA-Ys INPoLmcAL PHILOSOPHY 115-17 (1989)
(describing "liberal evolutionism" of Herbert Spencer as being perverted by progressives into
Social Darwinism).
12. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 586 n.37 (2d ed. 1988) ("What was
wrong was simply that, as a picture of freedom in industrial society, the one painted by the
Justices badly distorted the character and needs of the human condition and the reality of the
economic situation."); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner' Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 916-19 (1987)
(concluding that Lochner era courts saw rights as prepolitical, not recognizing that they are
subject to changing social and political conditions); Cf. SEMONCHE, supra note 7, at 431 (arguing
that "the Justices lagged behind the people's representatives in adjusting the law to the realities
of an industrialized society"); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective
Legislation in the ProgressiveEra, 1983 SUP. Cr. HIST. Socy Y.B. 53, 58 (stating that Justice
Holmes' dissent in Lochner "raised the spirits of the faithful and kept them hoping for a better
day and a court more attuned to contemporary realities").
This is not a new criticism. Se4 e.g., BLAINE F. MOORE, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ONAL LEGISLATION 125-27 (1913) (criticizing Supreme Court for paying too much
UNCONSTImT
attention in economic liberty cases to abstract theories of individual rights, rather than actual
modem conditions).
13. See e.g., ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE,
1865-1910, at 84 (1951) [hereinafter MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM] (accusing Court of
"an unadorned endorsement of the strong and wealthy at the expense of the weak and poor");
TRIBE, supranote 12, at 589 (criticizing economic, social, and judicial philosophy espoused by
LochnerCourt); WIECEK, supra note 7, at 126 (claiming that"freedom of contract meant freedom
of the rich to impose terms"); c. MichaelJ. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due
Pess, 1987 WIS. L REv. 265, 275 (depicting Lochner era jurisprudence as vulnerable "to the
claim that [it] benefitted established economic interests at the expense of the relatively
powerless"); Urofsky, supranote 12, at 58 (stating that decisions like Lochner"gave credence to
charges that the bench had gone over completely to the service of big business in opposing
humane reform legislation").
Such criticism has persisted for decades. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Labor Legislation as an
EnlargementofIndividualLiberty, 15 AM. LAB. LEGAL REV. 155, 155 (1925) (arguing that process
of meeting burden of proof in cases challenging labor legislation weighs in favor of big
business); Albert M. Kales, "DueProcess,"the InarticulateMajorPremiseand theAdamson Act, 26YALE
LJ. 519,523 (1917) (setting forth premise that government promotion of unions and collective
bargaining promotes "general welfare of employees").
14. BELL, supra note 11, at 36-37 (claiming that courts in aftermath of Lochner were
"espousers of conservative sentiment," reducing rights of blacks and sustaining racial segregation
for over 30 years); RAYFORD LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 17-18 (1965) (arguing that
courts' failure to include positive economic rights under Civil War Amendments was result of
enormous post-Civil War industrial growth and industrial profiteering); Malik Simba, The Black
Laborer, the Black Legal Experience and the United States Supreme Court with Emphasis on
the Neo-Concept of Equal Employment 323-27 (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Minnesota) (noting Supreme Court's role in failing to secure civil rights and economic parity
for blacks from Civil War to 1970s).
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The irony of this criticism is that during the Lochner era labor
unions generally excluded blacks-as well as women and immigrants-from their ranks. 5 In fact, as former NAACP general
counsel Herbert Hill demonstrates in his book, Black Labor and the
American Legal System, the history of the rise of labor legislation in the
United States from the turn of the century until the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 196416 is in significant part the story of unions
dominated by American-born white males using the legal system to
monopolize the labor market at the expense of those excluded
groups.' 7 Blacks, women, and immigrants were the silent third
parties in cases between unions and business enterprises," and their
interests almost always lay with the latter. Far from being ill-conceived
and "old-fashioned," decisions striking down legislation benefiting
labor unions truly did protect millions of vulnerable workers from
monopolistic legislation.
This Article focuses on the devastating effects of union-sponsored
labor legislation on black workers. Part I discusses the historical
animosity that existed between labor unions and blacks that resulted
largely from the unions' recalcitrant refusal to admit blacks into their
ranks or to treat them fairly when admitted. Part II considers two
examples of union-sponsored legislation that served to exclude black
workers: laws regulating railroad labor and laws regulating the use of
employees on public works projects. In both cases, the legislation
originated mainly at the state level, where Lochner era courts often
held it unconstitutional. Eventually, however, the unions persuaded
Congress to pass national legislation just before the rise of the New

15. 3 PHILIP FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1900-1909, at 219-32, 256-81
(1964) [hereinafter PHILIP FONER] (discussing union discrimination against women, African-

Americans, and immigrants).
The discriminatory policies of unions against blacks, women, and immigrants were well
recognized at the time and served as a propaganda point for business spokesmen. Se, e.g.,
LEAGUE FOR INDUS. RIGHTS, THE OPEN SHOP: A DEBATE 16 (1921) (argument of Walter G.
Merritt, Counsel, League for Industrial Rights) (attacking labor unions as elitist, discriminatory
organizations).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (1988) & Supp. II 1992)).
17. HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABORAND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1-37 (1977) [hereinafter
HILL, BLACK LABOR); see also Herbert Hill, Race,Ethnicily and OrganizedLabor. The Opposition to
Affirmative Action, NEW POL, Winter 1987, at 31, 33 [hereinafter Hill, Race and OrganizedLabor]
(stating that labor unions "functioned primarily to advance the interests of white workers, to
guarantee them privileges in the labor market").
18. Cf HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 26 ("[N]ational labor law was, until 1964,
concerned almost exclusively with the regulation of relations between management and
organized labor, leaving such 'third parties' as blacks and women unprotected from
discriminatory employment practices.").
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Deal era. 9 This legislation, some of which the courts proceeded to
uphold,2" was significantly strengthened by new amendments and
regulations initiated during the early years of the Roosevelt administration.2 ' The result was the destruction of tens of thousands of the
best paying jobs once held by blacks.
Part III discusses the even more devastating effects of New Deal
labor legislation on black workers. As a direct result of the New Deal,
and the courts' acquiescence to it, hundreds of thousands, perhaps
millions, ofjobs held by blacks were permanently destroyed, creating
the roots of today's underclass.2 2 The demise of laissez-faire jurisprudence is thus directly responsible for one of the most pressing social
problems and greatest human tragedies currently facing the United
States.
The Article concludes by arguing that liberty of contract, rather
than generally serving the interests of the elite at the expense of
humble laborers, often served to protect the most disadvantaged,
disenfranchised workers from monopolistic legislation sponsored by
politically powerful discriminatory labor unions. This new understanding of the historical effects of laissez-faire jurisprudence should
lead legal scholars and the courts to reconsider their overwhelming
hostility to serious judicial review of economic regulation that grants
monopoly power in the labor market.
I.

THE RACIST HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS

As early as 1871, Frederick Douglass recognized the danger posed
to black workers by white-dominated, monopolistic labor organizations. 2- Until about the turn of the century, however, unions

19. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988)); Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended

at 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1988)).
20. See Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930)
(upholding Railway Labor Act).
21. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended ch. 691, 48 Stat.
1185 (1934); Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended ch. 825, § 1, 49 Stat.
1011 (1935).
22. See infra notes 329-49 and accompanying text (discussing rise of underclass as result of
New Deal). For perspectives on the underclass, see KEN AULE=rA, THE UNDERCLASS xiii-xviii
(1984) (outlining concept of "underclass"); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 56-135 (1984)
(describing life for poor individuals, including opportunities for employment, educational
background, and family life); WILLIAMJ. WILSON, THE DECINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 144-54
(1978) [hereinafter WILSON, DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RAE] (providing broad perspective of
social change in America with specific focus on economic conditions of black population);
WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED vii-xi (1988) (illustrating problems of urban
underclass in America and discussing public policy approaches used to combat these problems).
23. Frederick-Douglass, The Tyranny, Folly, and Wiwkedness ofLabor Unions, NEW NATIONAL
ERA, Mar. 23, 1871, cited in ROBERT L. FA-rOR, THE BLACK RESPONSE TO AMERICA 45 (1970); see
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generally did not pose a grave economic threat to black workers
because of the small number of union members and the concentration of blacks in rural areas. 4 Between 1897 and 1904, however, the
total membership of American trade unions rose from 447,000 to
2,072,700.25 Meanwhile, increasing numbers of blacks migrated to
urban areas where they competed with union members for jobs.
At this time, and throughout the Lochner era, American Federation
of Labor (AFL) unions and the Railroad Brotherhoods were the
primary American labor unions.2 6 The AFL's member unions almost
universally engaged in racial discrimination, ranging from complete
exclusion of blacks to segregation into Jim Crow locals. All of the
Railroad Brotherhoods excluded blacks. 8
Because of unions' racist policies, black leaders across the political
Booker T. Washington,
spectrum rallied to the anti-union cause.'
Douglass' successor as the nation's leading black spokesperson,
frequently attacked labor unions."0 J.E. Bruce, a regular contributor
to The Colored American, wrote in 1902 that labor unions were "a
greedy, grasping, ruthless, intolerant, overbearing, dictatorial
combination of half-educated white men. ...

I am against them

because they are against the Negro."3 ' In 1924, Professor (later
Dean) Kelly Miller of Howard University advised blacks to "stand
shoulder to shoulder with the captains of industry" in opposition to
trade unions. s2 Bishop Carey of Atlanta, a prominent black churchman, added that black interests lay with the strength of the American

FACTOR, supra (recognizing Douglass' critical assessment of political activity of white labor and
its refusal to allow blacks into its unions).
24. Cf STERLING D. SPERO &ABRAM L. HARms, THE BLACKWORKER 21 (1931) (recognizing
that at this time national unions were "almost powerless").
25. PHILIP FONER, supranote 15, at 27.
26. PHILIP FONER, supranote 15, at 27.
27. See, e.g., PHILIP FONER, supranote 15, at 233-55; CHARLES WESLEY, NEGRO ]LABOR INTHE
UNITED STATES ch. IX (1927); FRANK WOLFE, ADMISSION TO AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS ch. 6
(1912); cf. Shipstead Hearings,supranote 1, at 605 (statement of Charles W. Chestnutt, Member,
Ohio Bar). Mr. Chestnutt pointed out:
The labor unions not only discriminate against colored men in admission to the
unions, but in some unions to which they are admitted they are denied the full
benefits of those unions. The locals decide the distribution of labor, but the colored
member is usually the last to be supplied with ajob, if at all.
ShipsteadHearings,supranote 1, at 605 (statement of Charles W. Chestnutt, Member, Ohio Bar).
28. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 12.
29. Cf.AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880-1915, at 168-69 (1969) (noting
that most black leaders opposed unions).
30. See Booker T. Washington, The Negro and the Labor Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June
1913, at 753, 756.
31. Bruce Grit, THE COLORED AMERICAN, Oct. 18, 1902, at 3.
32. Kelly Miller, The Negro as a Workingman, 6 AM. MERCURY 310, 313 (1925).
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economy and the white industrial leaders who controlled it, rather
than with labor unions.3
Marcus Garvey, a black nationalist and leader of the "Back to
Africa" movement, urged black workers to undercut union wages until
they could gain economic self-sufficiency.' He argued that "the only
convenient friend the Negro worker or laborer has in America at the
present time is the white capitalist."35 W. E. B. Du Bois, a socialist,
grew so frustrated with the labor movement's intransigent refusal to
grant blacks equal rights that he wrote this paean to businessmen:
"The white employers, North and South, literally gave the Negroes
work when white men refused to work with him; when he 'scabbed'
for bread and butter the employers defended him against mob
violence of white laborers; they gave him educational institutions
when white labor would have left him in ignorance.""6
Some scholars assert that the roots of labor union hostility toward
blacks stemmed from the willingness of Southem blacks to work for
lower wages than would whites in the same occupation.' This could
not have been the main source of union hostility toward blacks,
however, because the unions could have blunted this source of
tension by inviting blacks to join. The vast majority of blacks would
have willingly given up whatever privileges they had acquired through
the "dual labor market" in exchange for the higher wages, better
working conditions, and greater job security that came with union
Moreover, the wage differential theory does not
membership.'
explain why unions in the North were at least as hostile to blacks as
were Southern unions, despite the fact that racial wage differentials
were rare in the North.39

SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 135.
34. See SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 135.
35. SPFRO & HARRIs, supra note 24, at 135 (quoting Marcus Garvey).
36. Du Bois, Denial ofJustic, supranote 2, at 46.
37. See, e.g., WILsoN, DEcLNiNG SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE, supra note 22, at 150 (citing
example of disproportionate pay among whites and blacks in railroad industry); Edna Bonacich,
A Theory ofEthnicAntagonism: The Split LaborMarket, 37 AM. Soc. REV. 547, 553 (1972) (arguing
that conflict develops where workers of different ethnicity earn different wages for same work).
38. See Charles S.Johnson, Negro Workers and the Unions, THE SuRVEY, Apr. 15, 1928, at 113,
114 ("When the trade unions have been open to them, Negroes have entered as freely as white
workers.").
39. See SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 174 ("There is in the North, as a rule, no
discrimination as to wage rates. With few exceptions when a Negro does the same work as a
white man he receives the same rate of pay."); cf. Shipstead Hearings, supra note 1, at 61013
(statement of Harry E. Davis, Member, Ohio House of Representatives) (describing case of
violent union discrimination in Cleveland, Ohio).
33.
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Other historians have alleged that the disproportionate role blacks
played in strikebreaking led to white workers' hostility.'
This view
overlooks the fact that blacks found strikebreaking, expedient only
because they were barred from many unionized industries; white
workers successfully pressured their employers not to hire blacks.4
When white workers went on strike, employers felt free to ignore their
employees' opposition to black co-workers, and blacks often took the
opportunity to break into new industries.4 2
White union members and leaders generally refused to consider the
strategy of treating blacks as equals, despite the potential economic
benefit to them.4' Instead, they regularly organized (occasionally
violent) strikes aimed at forcing their employers to pursue a
whites-only hiring policy.' While these strikes rarely succeeded, they

40. E.g.,JOHN P. ROCHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DREAM 22 (1963) (noting that southerners
viewed blacks as "perpetual strikebreakers" who interfered with whites' efforts to unionize);
SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 128 (asserting that blacks' role in strikebreaking increased
racial tension).
41. RobertJ. Cottrol, Book Review, 67 TtL. L. REV. 1531, 1556 (1993) (discussing how
restrictions on jobs for blacks were demanded by white workers); seeJOHN G. VAN DEUSEN, THE
BLACK MAN IN WHITE AMERICA 59 (1944) ("Even though the employer were unprejudiced, he
dared not employ Negroes, for if he did so his white employees might leave."); WESLEY, supra
note 27, at 236 ("It mattered not how unprejudiced the employer might be, his employees
would refuse to work with Negroes on the same job.").
42. Johnson, supra note 38, at 114. Johnson writes:
[M]any of the greatest advances which Negroes have made in industry, many of their
first opportunities, are due to strikes and their part in breaking them. They were used
to break the stockyard strike, and they have been employed there ever since; they were
largely responsible for the failure of the steel strike, and they have been employed
there ever since; and they now make up 17 percent of the steel mill workers; they were
used in the great railroad strike of 1922, and about 700 Negroes, mostly skilled, are still
employed by one system alone.... The list could be continued indefinitely.
Id.; see also VAN DEUSEN, supranote 41, at 60 (describing black penetration into building trades
after Chicago strike in 1900, meat packing industry following Chicago strike in 1921, steel
industry after Pittsburgh strike in 1917, coal industry after Pennsylvania strike in 1922, railway
shopmen in 1922, metal trades after Detroit strike in 1921, and brickmaking after NewJersey
strike in 1923). As Van Deusen notes, "criticism of the Negro strikebreaker comes with poor
grace from unionists who subscribe to a policy of excluding Negroes from their Union." VAN
DEUSEN, supranote 41, at 59.
In this context, an important liberty-of-contract case was Mathews v. People, 67 N.E. 28 (III.
1903). In Mathews, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a statute proscribing the state
employment bureau from furnishing a list of unemployed laborers to any employer whose
workmen were on strike. Id. at 36.
43. See Alexander Saxton, Race and the House of Labor, in THE GREAT FEAR. RACE IN THE
MIND OF AMERICA 98, 118 (Gary B. Nash & Richard Weiss eds., 1970) (noting that NAACP
actually proposed joint commission with AFL to seek ways of bringing blacks into labor unions
in order to discourage strikebreaking, but that proposal was rejected by AFL).
44. See ROBERT HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS INTHE AMERICAN ECONOMY,
1865-1914, at 34-37 (1977) (noting that in last 20 years of nineteenth century, Labor Department
recorded 50 strikes initiated to discourage employment of blacks, and that there were probably
considerably more); HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 15 (describing incident in which 10
black railroad workers were killed after white labor union led strike to force displacement of
black workers from their jobs).
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did increase blacks' bitterness toward unions, encouraging them to
break strikes and pursue other anti-union activities.
The unions excluded and segregated blacks for two major reasons.
First, labor unions served not only the economic function of acting as
bargaining proxies for workers, but also a social function, much like
a lodge or private club.' Most white union workers simply refused
to allow blacks into their unions because their own social status would
decline if they associated with blacks, and because mixing with blacks
would imply a degree of social equality that most whites belligerently
refused to acknowledge.' The second reason for union discrimination was purely economic; if unions could exclude blacks, as well as
women and immigrants, the supply of labor in their trades would
decline significantly, leading to a 47significant rise in the price
employers would pay for union labor.
Considering the discriminatory policies that unions pursued during
the Lochner era together with the fact that blacks were largely
disenfranchised,' it is not surprising that much pro-union legislation
passed during that period harmed black workers. Lochner-era labor
legislation was discriminatory for three different reasons. First, unions
lobbied for some legislation primarily because it would have the direct
49
and intended effect of restricting competition from black workers.
Second, some labor legislation was motivated by several interrelated
considerations, only one of which was excluding blacks from the
field.' Finally, the negative effects on blacks of some labor legislation were mostly incidental; legislators simply did not account for
45. See SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 287 (noting importance of social aspects of
unions).
46. See W. E. B. Du BOIS, THE NEGRO ARTISAN 155 (1902) ("[T]he industrial up-building
of the South has brought to the front a number of white mechanics, who from birth have
regarded Negroes as inferiors and can with the greatest difficulty be brought to regard them as
brothers in this battle for better conditions of labor.").
Herbert Northrup notes that most of the Railroad Brotherhoods were founded as fraternal
and benevolent societies rather than as trade unions. HERBERT R. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR
AND THE NEGRO 50 (rev. ed. 1971).

Members refused to admit blacks because that would be

tantamount to admitting that blacks were the "social equal" of whites. Id.; cf. IRA DA REID,
NEGRO MEMBERSHIP IN AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS 45 (1930) (discussing union's refusal to admit
blacks because of refusal to accept social equality).
47. SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 56; cf. ABRAHAM EPSTEIN, THE NEGRO MIGRANT IN
PITTSBURGH 41 (reprint ed. 1969) (explaining that blacks believed that unions opposed making

them members out of fear that doing so would "flood the city with skilled Southern Negroes");
VAN DEUSEN, supra note 41, at 56 (illustrating union members' anger at decline in labor
standards after blacks penetrated labor market by breaking strikes).
48. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTICTION AND
THE ONE-PARiTy SOUTH, 1888-1910, at 33 (1974) (detailing methods used to disenfranchise
Southern blacks).
49. See, e.g., infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing railroad licensing
legislation intended to reduce black employment).
50. See, e.g., infra notes 196-237 and accompanying text (discussing Davis-Bacon Act).
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their interests.5 1 Such legislation should still be considered discriminatory, however, because its effect was to monopolize the labor
market on behalf of white workers.5 2 Moreover, the unions vigorously contested any attempts to ameliorate the negative effects of such
legislation on blacks through civil rights enforcement.1S
II.

THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

Many scholars criticize Lochner-era courts for interfering with the
sort of government activism that they claim could have been of great
benefit to blacks.54 They note, for example, that the courts were far
more interested in protecting liberty of contract through the
doctrines of substantive due process and strict construction of the
enumerated powers of Congress than in protecting the civil rights of
blacks. 5
Without apologizing for the general lack of courage and moral
foresight exhibited by the courts on civil rights issues,5 6 it should be
noted that it was not primarily judicial attitudes that prevented civil
rights enforcement by the Federal Government during the Lochner
era. In the early twentieth century, racism in American society was at
its highest point since the Civil War 7 Congress and the executive

51. See, e.g., infra notes 243-87 and accompanying text (discussing labor provisions of
National Industrial Recovery Act). See generally David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical
Example of the Use of Government Regulatory PowerAgainst Afiican-Americans, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(forthcoming Fall 1993) (describing diverse origins of licensing legislation that discriminated
against blacks).
52. See, e.g., infra notes 125-72 and accompanying text (discussing Railway Labor Act).
53. See, e.g., infranotes 291-316 and accompanying text (discussing union opposition to and
ultimate defeat of civil rights clause in Wagner Act).
54. E.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 162 (1960) (concluding
that rather than setting pace of social reform, Lochner era Court halted trend towards
governmental intervention); Bertram Wyatt-Brown, IntroductiontoMOOREFiELD STOREY, CHARLES
SUMNER (Arthur M. SchlesingerJr. ed., 1983) (contending that liberals, including liberaljudges,
distanced themselves from cause of black rights because of fear of class legislation and
centralization of government power).
55. E.g., MCCLOStEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM, supranote 13, at 116 ("Human rights must
give way when they conflict with the rights of the property owner."); McCLoSKEY, SUPREME
COURT, supranote 54, at 101-35 (arguing that after Civil War, primary interest of Court was to
guide America into economic greatness); Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 6 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1957) (maintaining that Court's essential
role was to keep government from interfering with business rather than to protect individual
rights and liberties); David R. Pollack, Emancipation and the Law: A Century of Progress, in 100
YEARS OF EMANCIPATION 169 (Robert Goldwin ed., 1964) (charting evolution of Supreme Court's
perspective on Fourteenth Amendment from protection of blacks to protection of business).
56. But see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (striking down residential
segregation law that prohibited blacks from acquiring property in predominantly white
neighborhoods); cases cited infra note 357.
57. See 9 ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 736 (1984) ("During the

Progressive era, racism took deeper roots in American society than at any time since the Civil
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branch of the Federal Government were often extremely hostile to
blacks. For example, the 1866 and 1871 federal Civil Rights Acts5 s
remained on the books, but Congress and the President lacked
interest in enforcing them. 9 The Wilson administration showed its
commitment to civil rights by segregating the entire federal
workforce.60
Indeed, while blacks had an often unfulfilled strong interest in
having the National Government actively protect them from state
discrimination, they also had an interest in limiting economic
regulation by the National Government. Given public opinion
prevalent during the Lochner era, and the widespread disenfranchisement of potential black voters,61 any national economic legislation
was likely to operate to blacks' disadvantage. The American system of
federalism, which divided the United States into dozens of jurisdictions, allowed blacks to escape the areas where they suffered most
from hostile economic regulation.62 Southern racists who desired a
docile black labor force labored mightily, but largely unsuccessfully,
63
to prevent such migration.
As the twentieth century progressed, the same federalist economic
flexibility that helped blacks became the scourge of labor unions and
their sympathizers. The unions objected that manufacturers could
evade Northern and Midwestem States' economic regulations by

War."). This attitude was reflected in increased violence against blacks and the rise of dejure
segregation. Id. at 746.

58. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986 (1988 & Supp. MI1991)); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1987-1991 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991)); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31,
14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1987-1992 (1988 & Supp. H 1991)).
59. Cf McCLoSKEY, SUPREME COURT, supra note 54, at 120-21 (noting that "civil rights acts"
which were designed to protect rights of blacks did nothing to curb state discrimination based
on race).
60. See LOGAN, supra note 14, at 359-67 (discussing black leaders' responses to Wilson's
candidacy and presidency); NancyJ. Weiss, The Negro and the New Freedom: Frghting Wilsonian

Segregation, 84 POL. Sc. Q. 61, 61 (1969) (discussing segregation policy of Wilson administration).
61. See KOUSSER, supra note 48, at 33 (noting that large numbers of blacks were
disfranchised by literacy and poll tax qualifications during Lochner era); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475, 482-84 (1903) (illustrating disfranchising provisions of Alabama law).
62. SeePriceV. Fishback, Can CompetitionAmongEmployers Reduce GovernmentalDiscrimination?
Coal Companies and Segregated Schools in West irginiain the Early 1900s, 32J.L & EcON. 311, 324

(1989) ("Since blacks historicallywere disenfranchised, their ability to prevent [hostile economic
legislation] was limited to voting with their feet across political jurisdictions.").
63.

Leo Alilunas, Statutory Means ofImpeding Emigrationof the Negro, 22J. NEGRO HiST. 148,

149 (1937) (describing laws aimed at reducing emigration). See genera!y Williams v. Fears, 179
U.S. 270, 278 (1900) (upholding emigrant agent laws, which served to restrict black mobility by
inhibiting labor recruitment by Northern industry).
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moving to the South." Thus began the crusade to nationalize
economic regulations, and to try to prevent the Supreme Court from
standing in the way.'
The next part of this Article explores two areas, railroad labor
regulation and public works labor regulation, in which unions
supported pre-New Deal labor legislation that threatened black
workers' economic welfare. Blacks in the railroad and construction
industries held many skilled positions, and the two industries
accounted for a large percentage of black males employed in
nonagricultural occupations.'
This legislation originally was promulgated mainly at the state level,
thus limiting the harm to blacks who could flee such legislation.6 7
Just before the New Deal, however, the Federal Government stepped
in and began to help racist railroad and construction unions
dominate their labor markets.' Further regulation during the New
Deal solidified the unions' monopolization of their labor markets,
with disastrous consequences for excluded black workers.69
A.
1.

RailroadLabor Legislation

Early discriminatory legislation

By the beginning of the Lochner era, tens of thousands of blacks had
found relatively remunerative work on American railroads.70
Nevertheless, the railroad industry was also the site of the most
virulent forms of organized labor's racially discriminatory policies.
Unions in the railroad industry launched collective bargaining in
the 1880s, and they developed into some of the strongest unions in
64. See Edward S. Corwin, Social PlanningUnder the Constitution: A Study in Perspectives, 26
AM. POL. So. REv. 1, 15, 22 (1932).
65. Id. (arguing that all businesses whose operations extend beyond state boundary should
be subject to fair and reasonable regulation by Congress).
66. See SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 159 (illustrating graphically percentage of blacks
in building crafts); id. at 285 (providing U.S. Department of Labor Statistics for number of
blacks in railroad industry); see also Charles E. Hall, The American Negro, His Histy andLiterature,
in NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1932, at 290, 292, 303 (William L. Katz ed., 1969)
(providing U.S. Department of Commerce and Bureau of Census statistics for black occupational
distribution).
67. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (discussing state laws that discriminated
against black railroad workers); infra notes 180-96 (discussing state regulation of construction
labor).
68. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing Railway Labor Act of 1926);
infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text (discussing Davis-Bacon Act).
69. See infranotes 131-47 (discussing 1934 amendments to Railway Labor Act of 1926); infra
notes 222-37 (discussing 1935 amendments to Davis-Bacon Act and subsequent regulations
promulgated by Department of Labor).
70. See, e.g., SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 269 (noting that by 1918, blacks accounted
for 20% of workforce on railroads).
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the country.7 1 Nearly all of the railroad transportation unions
72
banned blacks from membership by constitutional provision.
Because blacks had never acquired many jobs as conductors or
engineers, 3 it was not difficult to exclude them from those jobs.
The Trainmen's and Firemen's Brotherhoods had more difficulty
excluding blacks from their crafts because many blacks had entered
those occupations at a time when the jobs were hot and dirty and
therefore considered "Negro work."74 As technological improvements made these jobs easier, they became attractive stepping stones
to conductors' and engineers' positions, and they increasingly
appealed to white workers.'5 As a result, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
launched efforts to exclude blacks from their occupations.7 6
One such effort consisted of strikes for a whites-only hiring policy.
Such strikes often involved violence against black railroad workers.77
In 1911, for example, a strike against the Cincinnati, New Orleans
and Texas Pacific Railroad protesting the employment of blacks led
to the murder of ten black firemen.'
The strikers eventually
reached an accord with the railroad that guaranteed that blacks would
not be employed on the company's line north of Oakdale and

71. Walter E. Williams, Freedom to Contract: Blacks and Labor Organizations,GOV'T-UNION
REV., Summer 1981, at 28, 31 (noting that railroad labor unions are among oldest and most
powerful in nation).
72. SPERO & HARRiS, supra note 24, at 22 (noting that Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, Brotherhood of Railway Conductors, and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen were among unions that premised membership eligibility on race); RAY MARSHALL,
THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED ]LABOR 89-96 (1965) (describing union exclusion of blacks by
constitutions of Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, Boilermakers, and International Association of
Machinists); Ray Marshall, TheNegro in Southern Unions, in THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOvEAENT 128, 134-35 (JuliusJacobson ed., 1968) [hereinafter Marshall, The Negro in Southern
Unions] (stating that International Association of Machinists, Blacksmiths, Boilermakers, and
Maintenance-of-Way Employees were among those unions to constitutionally bar black
membership).
73. SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 284; cf.VAN DEUSEN, supra note 41, at 60 (indicating
that blacks had only limited opportunities to advance beyond unskilled positions in railroad
industry).
74. See SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 284 (explaining how at turn of century some
Southern railroad companies employed firemen crews consisting of 85% to 90% black workers).
75. SPERO & HARRIs, supra note 24, at 315 (noting that technological advances made
exclusively black rail jobs such as brakeman attractive to whites, but in addition these advances
threatened jobs for both whites and blacks).
76. See Marshall, The Negro in Southern Unions, supra note 72, at 135-36 (noting that unions
attempted to exclude blacks from railroad jobs by contractual agreements with employers).
77. See HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 15 (describing violent incidents in Texas and
Georgia following all-white unions' petition to replace black railroad workers with whites);John
M. Matthews, The Georgia "Race Strike" of 1909, 40J. S. HIST. 613, 617-21 (1974) (describing
violence during strike by Firemen and Enginemen's Union, and government's refusal to protect
black workers).
78. HILL, BLACK LABOR, supranote 17, at 15; SPERO & HARRIs, supra note 24, at 291.
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Chattanooga, Tennessee, and that the overall percentage of black
firemen was not to exceed their percentage extant on January 1,
1911." 9 Workers soon reached a similar agreement with the Southern Railroad of Georgia."0 In general, however, similar strikes were
unsuccessful.
When the unions could not exclude blacks through the collective
bargaining process, they turned to government in an attempt to
monopolize the railroad labor force. During the infamous 1909
Georgia Race Strike, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
submitted a licensing bill to the Georgia Legislature, explaining, "The
justice which has been denied the white firemen of the Georgia
Railroad may be secured, not only for them, but for every white
fireman in the South, through legislation such as that now pending
in the lawmaking body of the State of Georgia." 1 The proposed bill
fixed the limitations and powers of the five-member Board of
Examiners, which was to be composed of firemen with not less than
three years' experience.8 2 The union expected that the bill's
enactment would "have the effect of reducing to a minimum the
number of Negro firemen eligible to fill that position on locomtives
[sic] in the state of Georgia."83
Railroad unions also tried to persuade legislatures to pass "full
crew" laws, which were operative in twenty-four states by 1939.84
Such laws provided that a train crew must consist of an engineer, a
fireman, a conductor, a brakeman, and a flagman.85 While ostensibly passed for safety reasons, these laws were really make-work for
union members.86 The laws also served to exclude blacks across the
country because state railroad officials, at the urging of the unions,
interpreted the laws to hold that the many black porters who did
trainmen's work were not trainmen for the purposes of the stat-

79. SPERO & HARIS, supra note 24, at 291.
80. See SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 292 (noting that railroad refused to employ black
firemen north of given point on rail line in order to evade strike).
81. See SPERO & HARmS, supra note 24, at 482 (quoting LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN'S AND
ENGINEMEN'S MAG., Aug. 1909, at 278).
82. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 482.
83. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 482. A similar bill was introduced in 1912. See
Edward A. Gaston, A History of the Negro Wage Earner in Georgia 240 (1957) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (describing bill requiring that all railway firemen be able
to read train orders).
84. See NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 52 (noting that railroad unions used full crew laws to
replace black workers with their white counterparts).
85. NORTHRuP, supranote 46, at 52.
86. NORTHRuP, supra note 46, at 52.
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utes.8 7 The porters thus had to be replaced by white trainmen in
order to comply with the law.'I The U.S. Supreme Court consistently upheld full crew laws.' 9 Despite these and other efforts by the
railroad unions to exclude blacks, there was no fundamental change
in blacks' relatively favorable position on the railroads until World
War I brought massive federal intervention in the railroad labor
market.
2.

World War I and federal intervention on the railroads

During World War I, labor shortages induced blacks to leave the
Southern railroads for more lucrative jobs in the North.'
The
traditional pay differential between whites and blacks, which normally
allowed blacks to compete successfully with exclusionary white unions
for employment, instead encouraged them to seek greener pastures. 91 In response, the Federal Government, which had taken over
the railroads during the war, ordered that black workers be paid the
same wages as whites for the jobs of fireman, switchman, and
92
trainman.
Immediately after the war ended, the railroad unions renewed their
efforts to force blacks out of the industry. They were aided in that
effort both by the fact that government control of the industry during
the war had greatly increased union power, and by the equal pay
order, which in the postwar period reduced the railroads' incentive
to employ blacks.9 3 When racially motivated strikes failed, white
trainmen once again took to terrorism, killing several black train94

men.

Finally, in order to pacify the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen,
which had threatened to disrupt all of the Southern lines, the Federal
Railroad Administration agreed in 1919 to new regulations benefiting
white trainmen at the expense of blacks. 95 One of the rules required

87. DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 302-03 (1976);
NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 52; August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, Attitudes ofNegroes Toward the
American LaborMovement from the Civil War to World War, in THE NEGRO IN THE AmERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 27, 46 (JuliusJacobson ed., 1968).
88. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 52.
89. SeeSt. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518,520-21 (1916); Chicago,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 466 (1911).
90. See generally EMMETT J. ScoTr, NEGRO MIGRATION DURING THE WAR 3-12 (1920)
(providing overview of exodus of blacks from South to urban markets in North).
91. SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 294.
92. See SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 295.
93. See HOWARD W. RISHER, THE NEGRO IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 38 (1971).

94. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 296-98 (describing situations in which black rail
workers were kidnapped, beaten, threatened, and even killed for refusing to leave jobs).
95.

SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 296-299.
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that all new applicants for positions of brakeman, flagman, and
switchman pass uniform written examinations. 6 Another rule
provided that "Negroes are not to be used as conductors, flagmen,
baggagemen, or yard conductors."9 7 Blacks had customarily served
as brakemen and whites as flagmen. Now, the position of brakeman
was to be filled by seniority, a change that would allow white trainmen
to displace blacks, while blacks were still banned from becoming
flagmen. 8 Other provisions were designed to force blacks out of the
occupation of porter and to prevent black porters from serving as
trainmen. 9
3.

Railroad unions decline, black railroadworkers benefit

Government domination of the railroads, including federal labor
rules, ended soon after the war. Approximately 136,000 blacks still
worked in the railroad industry in 1924, many of them in relatively
high-paying skilled and semiskilled positions."° While blacks still
could not get jobs as conductors and engineers, as of 1920 blacks
constituted about twenty-seven percent of the firemen, twenty-seven
percent of the brakemen, and twelve percent of the switchmen in the
Southern states.' 0'
a. Undercuttingthe union wage and strikebreaking
The ability of blacks to retain their positions in the railroad industry
in the face of union attempts to exclude them was in large part due
to their continued willingness to undercut union wages. On the Gulf
Coast Lines, for example, black firemen signed wage agreements
fixing their wages at about $0.50 to $1.00 less per hundred miles than
union rates.10 2 Blacks also benefited from their service as strikebreakers against racist unions.0 3 Such railroad occupations as
blacksmith, electrician, machinist, carman, and railway clerk were

96. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 300.
97. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 300.
98. See SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 301 (illustrating that regulations placed whites in
position of seniority, leaving no room for promotion of black employees).
99. See NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 51 (noting that reclassification of porters as porterbrakemen allowed older whites to claim these positions without providing new positions for
displaced blacks).
100. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 284-85.
101. SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 284.
102. SPERO & HARRIS, supranote 24, at 314.
103. Marshall, The Negro in Southern Unions, supranote 72, at 136. See generally supra notes 4042 and accompanying text (discussing black workers' successful penetration ofjob market as
strikebreakers).
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opened to blacks when they broke strikes by unions that had excluded
them from those positions.'
b.

The laborinjunction/yellow dog contract combination:
anathema to unions, a blessingfor blacks
Blacks also benefited from the weakening of the railroad unions in
the South during the 1920s, which coincided with the overall decline
of organized labor during that decade." 5 The decline of railroad
union power was due primarily to the use of labor injunctions by
federal judges. Such injunctions, often issued in response to violent
strikes,"° prohibited strike activity. Injunctions were used more
widely against railroad unions than any other segment of organized
107
labor.
One of the first great labor cases to reach the Supreme Court, In
re Debs,l°u illustrates how the use of the labor injunction benefited
black railroad workers. The case also presents an interesting example
of the ironies that occur when legal scholars discuss labor history
without acknowledging the depths of the historical antipathy between
blacks and unions. The Court's decision in Debs upheld a federal
injunction against Eugene V. Debs' whites-only American Railway
Union, which threatened to monopolize the railroad labor market. ° Derrick Bell points to Debs as an example of a case in which
the Court "denied rights to labor" just as it was denying rights to
blacks.'
Black railroad workers of the day, however, obviously
thought differently. They formed an "Anti-Strikers Railroad Union"
to help break the strike.'

104. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 287-90.
105. See Marshall, The Negro in Southern Unions, supra note 72, at 136.
106. Sylvestor Petro, Injunctions and LaborDisputes: 1880-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341,
345 (1978) (reporting that courts issued labor injunctions to stop union violence). The NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)),
banned federal injunctions against strikes.
107. See Forbath, supranote 7, at 1152 ("Injunctions figured in virtually every railroad strike
108. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). For other early labor cases involving railroads, see In 7e Higgins,
27 F. 443, 445 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1886) (asserting that labor union had no legal authority to require
workers to strike following unlawful discharge of employee); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Northern Pac. R1R., 60 F. 803, 822-24 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1894) (condemning labor strike as
destruction of "very fabric of our government" and enjoining labor unions from requiring
railroad workers to strike).
109. In reDebs, 158 U.S. 564,599-600 (1895); see alsoPHILIPS. FONER, ORGANIZED LABORAND
THE BLACK WORKER 1619-1973, at 104-05 (1974) (discussing background and holding in Debs).
110. SeeBELL, supranote 11, at37 & n.9.
111. WILLLAM H. HARRIS, THE HARDER WE RUN: BLACK WORKERS SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 41
(1982).
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In the years after Debs, courts often issued injunctions to enforce
"yellow dog" contracts, in which employees agreed not to join a
union. 112 Because the workers had agreed not to join a union, their
participation in strikes could be enjoined as violating their contracts.
In one of the first major examples of federal interference in labor
relations, Congress, at the behest of the railroad unions and partly in
response to the Debs decision, enacted a statute that banned interstate
railroads from enforcing "yellow dog" contracts against their employees.1 3 By increasing the power of racist unions, the law had a
deleterious effect on black railroad workers. In 1908, in Adair v.
United States,"4 the U.S. Supreme Court, relying heavily on Lochner,
struck down the law as a violation of freedom of contract." 5 The
Court subsequently overturned a state ban on yellow dog contracts on
intrastate railroads," 6 thus limiting the railroad unions' ability to
look to the states for help in monopolizing the railroad labor market.
The yellow dog/labor injunction combination, anathema to
organized labor and its sympathizers," 7 played a key role in helping
to maintain black employment on the railroads." 8 It is therefore no
wonder that two prominent black leaders from Ohio testified against

112. See Forbath, supra note 7, at 1212 (defining yellow dog contract).
113. (Erdman) Act ofJune 1, 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424, 428 (1898); seeJohn P. Roche,
EntrepreneurialLiberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 LAB. HIST. 3, 11 (1963) (discussing
congressional battle over Erdman Act and bill's final passage).
114. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
115. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173-80 (1908). For an example of early criticism
of Adair, see MOORE, supra note 12, at 116 (suggesting that Adair decision was "probably
diametrically opposed to the spirit of the freedom supposed to be guaranteed by the first ten
amendments, and the supporting argument [was] based on an ancient theory of individual
rights rather than upon any consideration of actual conditions").
116. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (permitting employers to condition
employment on entry into yellow dog contract); see also Montgomery v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 293 F.
680, 689 (9th Cir. 1923) (holding California anti-yellow dog contract law unconstitutional and
upholding injunction against railroad union), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 586 (1924).
117. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 37-42, 146-50
(1930) (reviewing history of use of labor injunctions in United States); JOEL I. SEIDMAN, The
Yellow Dog Contract,inJOHNs HOPKINs UNivERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

11, 85 (1932) (analyzing development, use, and effect ofyellow dog contracts as "most important
source of labor injunction").
Ironically, the eventual prohibition of yellow dog contracts worked to the detriment of small
businesses, which used the contracts most frequently, thus benefiting the large corporations that
progressives claimed to loathe. Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal Reform,
1917-1932, 30 LAB. HIST. 251, 251-52 (1989).
118. This is not to say that the railroad unions desired to eliminate yellow dog contracts and
labor injunctions for the specific purpose of harming blacks. But because of the unions' racism,
their legislative agenda and the interests of black railroad workers were necessarily at odds.
Similarly, the Supreme Court did not strike down anti-yellow-dog-contract laws out of concern
for racial justice, but because of economic liberty concerns. Coppagr,236 U.S. at 13 (applying
fundamental right to contract); Adair, 208 U.S. at 172-76 (relying on doctrine of liberty of
contract). In this historical context, however, laissez-faire ideology and the interests of racial
justice were in harmony.
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the Shipstead anti-injunction bill before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1928.119 "It logically follows," said Harry E. Davis, the
leading black Republican politician in Ohio, "that a colored worker
who is denied the protection and the benefits of organized labor
because they will not take him in, has only one place of redress in
case his right of employment is assailed, and that is in our courts.
.. "120 Davis added a compelling statement that tied freedom of
contract to the enumerated rights of property and liberty:
The group I represent has not got very much physical or tangible
property and their biggest asset is their right to a job, recognized
as a contract, but an intangible right, and I maintain that if this bill
becomes a law it would affect very materially their right
to the
21
biggest thing which they have, the right to earn a living.'
4.

National railroadlabor legislation as the downfall of black railroad
labor

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, railroad unions continued
1 22
their campaign against black workers, with marginal success.
Otherwise frustrated, unions once again turned to violence in an
attempt to exclude blacks from the industry. For example, white
unionized trainmen launched terrorist campaigns against black
trainmen in 1931,1' and at least ten black firemen and trainmen
were killed and twenty-one wounded in the lower Mississippi Valley
between 1931 and 1934.124 But it was not organized violence that
eventually led to the steep decline of blacks in the railroad industry.
Rather, it was federal intervention in the railroad labor market in
support of the railroad unions.
The great blow to black railroad labor was the Railway Labor Act of
1926,'" and, more precisely, the amendments to that Act passed in
1934.126 The Act guaranteed the right of workers to choose their

119. Shipstead Hearings,supra note 1, at 603-09 (statement of Charles W. Chestnutt, Member,
Ohio Bar); id. at 609-14 (statement of Harry E. Davis, Member, Ohio House of Representatives).
120. Shipstead Hearings,supra note 1, at 610 (statement of Harry E. Davis).
121. Shipstead Hearings,supra note 1, at 609 (statement of Harry E. Davis).
122. NORTHRuP, supranote 46, at 50-51 (stating that white railroad unions renewed their
efforts against blacks immediately after World War I in response to burgeoning success of blacks
in railroad industry).
123. David Born, Memphis Negro Wor*ingmen and the NAACP, 28 W. TENN. HIST. Soc'Y PAPERS
90, 100-01 (1974). While the unions were silent, the railroads offered rewards and investigative
assistance that helped catch the perpetrators. Id.
124. NORTHRup, supra note 46, at 54-55.
125. Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (amended 1934).
126. Railway Labor Act of 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§
151-188 (1988)). Once again, it should be emphasized that the primary motivation of the
railroad unions in lobbying for this legislation was not to harm black workers. See NORTHRUP,
supranote 46, at 55 (stating that original intent of Act was to guarantee bargaining rights). Even
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bargaining representatives." The Supreme Court not only upheld
this legislation in 1930, but interpreted it favorably for the unions,
holding that a railroad must deal only with the representative chosen
by a majority of employees,'2 8 despite the fact that white unions still
excluded blacks.129 Nevertheless, the Act's effects were minimal
until 1934.1
In 1934, Congress amended the Act to provide: "The majority of
any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who
shall be the representative of the class or craft .... "11 Despite the
Adair precedent, the 1934 amendments also outlawed yellow dog
contracts and the formation of company-financed unions.1 2 These
amendments gave tremendous power to racist unions. By 1935, union
membership on the railroads included 97.9% of engineers, 98.5% of
firemen, 99.1% of brakemen, 94.7% of yard servicemen, 85.3% of
telegraph operators, and 96% of signalmen.13 The unions immediately tried to use collective bargaining "to gain a favored position for
the white worker."1 3 4 The white unions' quest to monopolize the
railroad labor market was aided immensely by the 1934 Amendments'

if black railroad workers had not been a competitive threat, the unions still would have desired
the monopoly power conferred upon them by the Act. Id. The unions wanted to exclude all
nonunion workers from the railroads, not just blacks. The difference is that nonunion black
workers, unlike other nonunion workers, did not choose to stay out of the unions, but were
unable to join because of the unions' exclusionary policies. Id.
127. Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, 44 Stat. at 578 ("Representatives... shall be designated
by the respective parties ... without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either
party over the self-organization or designation of representatives by the other.").
128. SeeTexas& N.O.R.R v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,567-71 (1930).
129. See To Amend the Railway Labor Act... Providingfor Union Membership and Agreementsfor
Deductionfrom Wages of CarrierEmployees for CertainPurposes: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 3295, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1950) [hereinafter
Hearingson S. 3295] (statement ofJoseph C. Waddy, General Counsel, International Association
of Railway Employees) ("All of these delegates and general chairmen share the opinion mutually
with this committee, that the Negro is an undesirable in our particular vocation, therefore,
should be supplanted by a white man in all instances.") (quoting proceedings of 32d convention
of Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 1932).
130. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
131. Railway Labor Act of 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185, 1187 (1934) (codified at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1988)); see Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (upholding
Railway Labor Act as amended).
132. Id. § 2(a), 48 Stat. at 1187 ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any carrier... to use the funds
of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization .... "); see
Williams, supranote 71, at 31 (stating that 1934 amendments contradicted Adairdecision, which
struck down legislation forbidding employer discrimination against union members, and further
weakened bargaining power of black workers).
133. Clyde W. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 33, 50 n.114 (1947).
134. Note, JudicialRegulation of the Railway Brotherhoods'Discriminato"yPractices, 1953 WIS. L.
REV. 516, 517.
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establishment of the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the
National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB).
The NRAB had jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the
interpretation of collective agreements in the railway industry.136 It
was composed of thirty-six members, half chosen by the unions, and
half by the railroads.3 7 National unions were eligible to participate
in selecting the union representatives,"3 but this rule was applied
13 9
discriminatorily to prevent black unions from participating.
Union dominance of the NRAB led the Board to promulgate rules
that benefited white workers at the expense of blacks. For example,
in 1942 the First Division of the NRAB held that railroads could not
use porter-brakemen as brakemen, and that this decision should apply
in all instances."4 In practice, this decision required the railroads
to replace black porter-brakemen with white brakemen.
The NMB determined, by secret ballot of the involved employees
if necessary, which union would act as sole bargaining agent of any
class or craft.'
This process almost always led to the designation
of the discriminatory white Firemen's and Trainmen's unions as the
sole bargaining agent for blacks in those jobs. 42 Even in the rare
occasions when most of the voters in a railroad union election were
black, predominantly white unions managed to win the elections
through fraud; black workers protested to no avail.
The lack of
redress is not surprising given that many high-level members of the
NMB believed that the certification process should be a whites-only
affair. 1' The Firemen proceeded to negotiate a series of discrimi-

135. See Railway Labor Act of 1934, § 3(b), 48 Stat. at 1189-97 (establishing NRAB and NMB
and delineating their authority); see also NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 55 (stating that under
NMB and NRAB policy, blacks excluded from unions lost their bargaining power).
136. Railway Labor Act of 1934, § 3(i), 48 Stat. at 1191.
137. Id. § 3(a), 48 Stat. at 1189.
138. Id. § 3(c), 48 Stat. at 1189.
139. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 66.
140. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. A.T. & Santa Fe Ry., N.R.A.B. Award No. 6640 (1st
Div. 1942).
141. Railway Labor Act of 1934, § 2, 48 Stat. at 1188.
142. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 55. Northrup asserts that NMB policy made collective
bargaining "a mockery for the black minority on the roads when considered in the light of the
almost universal exclusion practiced against them." Id.
143. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 60.61 (citing example of election fraud and blaming NMB
for failure to investigate unlikely election outcome).
144. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 59 (citing NMB member's 1936 letter to Engineers' and
Firemen's Unions stating that black bargaining power represented "menace to the present setup
of railway labor organizations").
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natory agreements with the railroads that severely reduced the
employment of black firemen in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 45
Because blacks were not accepted for membership in most union
locals, or were relegated to a low status, they attempted to form their
own unions."
The NMB frustrated such attempts by ruling that
these alternative unions could not represent black employees because
the official unions already represented them.147 The NMB thus
bestowed de facto monopoly representation powers upon white labor
unions that refused to extend equal membership rights to blacks.
The issue of the legality of an exclusionary union monopoly
supported by the Government of the United States reached the courts
in Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. United Transport Service
Employees.' The case involved forty-five black train porters from St.
Paul, Minnesota who were ineligible for membership in the Clerks'
Union because of their race. 4 9 They unanimously voted for the
United Transport Service Employees of America (UTSEA) to be their
bargaining agent.15 ° The UTSEA applied to represent the black
porters, but, as it always did in the many cases in which blacks sought
to establish their own union,"' the NMB dismissed the application
on the grounds that the porters did not constitute a separate class of
employees. 15 2 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declared
the dismissal order void, pointing out that the dismissal forced black
employees to accept representation by an organization in which they
had neither the right to membership nor the right to speak or be
heard. 5 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision on
145. See NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 62-65 (citing attempts to curtail black employment
through racist policymaking); cf. Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Proceedings of the ThirtyThird Convention 22, 584-85 (1937) (affirming plan to eliminate blacks in interest of "safety").
To effectuate the exclusion of blacks, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen (BLF&E) entered into agreements with several railroads, including the Gulf, Mobile,
& Ohio Railroad, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, and Seaboard Air Line Railway, reservingjobs
for "promotable" white workers. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Officer's
Reports, 1941, at 553-54, cited in NORTHRUP, supranote 46, at 62-65. This period was also marked
by many "secret agreements" designed to undermine blacks. Id.
146. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 66 (describing blacks' failed attempts to form viable
unions).
147. National Mediation Board, Case No. R-621 (Apr. 30, 1940) (refusing to avail the
provisions of Railway Labor Act to blacks and rejecting their attempt to form a union), cited in
NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 66.
148. 137 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 715 (1943).
149. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Transp. Serv. Employees, 137 F.2d 817,819
(D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 715 (1943).
150. Id. at 820.
151. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing NMB refusals to recognize
independent black representatives).
152. National Mediation Board, Case No. R-774 (Nov. 12, 1941), citedin Williams, supranote
71, at 31.
153. Brotherhood ofRy. & S.S. Clerks, 137 F.2d at 821.
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the ground that the NMB's certifications were not subject to judicial
review.54 This decision paved the way for many future certification
proceedings that granted discriminatory labor unions exclusive
bargaining representation.'5 5
One year later, in the 1944 case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad,"' the Supreme Court held that the railroad unions' duty
of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act required them to
fairly represent all workers, including blacks.157 Nevertheless, the
ruling did not effectively reduce discrimination because the monopoly
powers conferred on recalcitrant racist unions by the Railway Labor
Act still existed. Also, Steele was not vigorously enforced by the
relevant government agencies. 1
To take one example of the Railway Labor Act's negative effects on
black workers, in 1940 the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, the
federally appointed exclusive bargaining agent for all railroad
firemen, demanded that all future firemen hired by the Southeastern
carriers be "promotable," i.e., white.'59 The carriers at first refused
the union's demand, replying: "[T]hese people are citizens of the
country; it is necessary that they make a living; colored people are
patrons of the railroads, and, in our opinion, we should not by
agreement entirely exclude them from employment in positions which
they have occupied and filled over the years."'"
The Brotherhood then called in the NMB. With the NMB's
encouragement, the railroad unions in 1941 signed a contract with
the Southeastern carriers that contained a clause stipulating that the
carriers would hire only "promotables" and reduce the number of
non-promotables on each line to fifty percent. 6 ' The test of
"promotability" was designed to keep blacks out.16
Indeed, the
agreement was eventually amended to state that "non-promotable"

154. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Transp. Serv. Employees, 320 U.S. 715, 719
(1943).
155. Williams, supra note 71, at 32.
156. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
157. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). The Court stated that
because Congress did not intend to authorize race discrimination, union representatives may
be enjoined from engaging in it. Id.; see also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
323 U.S. 210, 211 (1944) (affirming duty of exclusive bargaining representative to fairly
represent all workers without discriminating on basis of race).
158. See Williams, supra note 71, at 31 (describing Steele decision's lack of effect on
discrimination).
159. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Tunstall, 163 F.2d 289, 291 (4th Cir.) (noting
union's explicit demand for racist policy), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 841 (1947).
160. Id. at 292.
161. Id.
162. See id. (discussing discriminatory intent of promotability standard).
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meant "colored." 6 ' Despite Steele, this agreement remained in force
until 1951.1' By that time, the percentage of black firemen on that
railroad line had been reduced substantially, from about eighty-five
percent to about thirty-five percent'6
The Steele decision did not help black railroad workers until the
1950s. 6 6 By then it was too late to save the bulk of black jobs on
the railroads. 6 7 The percentage of black firemen had remained
steady nationwide from 1910 to 1930, but dropped from 6.9% to 5.0%
between 1930 and 1940.1'
The percentage of black firemen
dropped from 41.4% in the South in 1920 to 33.1% in 1930 and
29.5% in 1940.169 In the longer term, by 1960 only seven percent
of Southern railroad firemen were black. 7 By the time the government tried to make up for its past wrongs through affirmative action
policies in the 1970s, it was too late to help black workers significantly
because of the severe decline in railroad employment.17 1 As labor
historian Herbert Northrup concludes in his study of black workers
and organized labor, "In no other industry has collective bargaining
had such disastrous results for Negroes." 72
It should be added, however, that ubiquitous collective bargaining
on the railroads through racist labor unions did not happen spontaneously. The Federal Government encouraged, and indeed commanded
it. More precisely, then, in no other industry did the abandonment
of liberty of contract and the establishment of federal intervention in
the labor marketplace have such a disastrous effect on black labor.

163. Id. ("It is understood and agreed that the phrase 'non-promotable fireman' ... refers
only to colored fireman.").
164. See Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R1, 186 F.2d 473, 480 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding
agreement discriminatory and void).
165. Id. at 476.
166. See Williams, supra note 71, at 33 (stating that Steele had little effect on entrenched
discrimination). Indeed, as late as 1971, Herbert Northrup wrote: "Ifequal opportunity comes
to the railroads, it will come thirty years too late." NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 34.
167. In anticipation of enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen finally removed a black exclusion clause from its constitution in 1964.
Wiflliams, supranote 71, at 34 (discussing ineffectiveness of attempts to reform racist unions).
By then it was apparent that few, if any, additional firemen would ever be hired on American
railroads. Herbert Hill, The AFL-CIO and the Black Worker. Twenty-Five Years After the Merge, 10
J. INTERGROUP REL.5, 20 (1982) [hereinafter Hill, TheAFL-CIO and the Black Worker] (discussing
crippling effect of decades of discrimination on black firemen).
168. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 53 (tbl. Ia).
169. NORTHRuP, supranote 46, at 53 (tbl. Ila).
170. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 53 (tbl. Ila).
171. See NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at xc.
172. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 100; see id.
at 93-94 (stating that in addition to blatantly
pro-union legislation, federal minimum wage law also had dire consequences for black railroad
laborers because it encouraged mechanization).
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B. Public Works Labor Legislation
By the beginning of the Lochner era, construction craft unions
affiliated with the AFL were among the most powerful unions in the
United States. They excluded blacks completely from most of their
unions, while carpenters and bricklayers, faced with large numbers of
potential black competitors, relegated black workers to second-class
segregated locals."' 3 Despite this discrimination, blacks constituted
a significant percentage of skilled construction labor in the South."
Blacks also retained their antebellum strength in the trowel
trades-bricklaying, plastering, and cement finishing7 5-composing
sixty-one percent of the South's bricklayers and forty-four percent of
plasterers and cement finishers. 76 Blacks were numerous enough
in those fields to create their own informal training programs and to
allow their employers to withstand labor boycotts by white unionists
seeking revenge for the "crime" of hiring black labor.'77 Indeed,
blacks so dominated these fields that their large numbers sometimes
forced the unions to offer them equal status. 78
1.

Early state laws

By the 1890s, construction unions began to lobby successfully for
state laws regulating labor on public works projects.'7 These laws
usually required either that contractors hired by state or city governments pay workers the "prevailing," i.e. union, wage or that they hire
only union workers." ° Northern and Western states passed most of
the laws, and they were directed mainly against immigrants; their
limited effect on blacks was more incidental than intentional.'8
173. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 114 (stating that black workers excluded from
construction unions were perceived as threat to white labor).
174. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 18-19.
175. See NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 7 (stating that trowel trade unions endeavored to
enforce economic equality and condemned discrimination against blacks).
176. Mark Kruman, QuotasforBlacks: The PublicWorks Administrationand the Black Construction
Worker, LAB. HIsT., Winter 1975, at 37, 38.
177. Marshall, The Negro in Southern Unions, supra note 72, at 145.
178. NORTHRup, supra note 46, at 7, 44 (stating that because black support was needed by
unions to organize South, unions offered blacks "equal status").
Northrup apparently
exaggerates the extent to which trowel trade unions actually granted blacks equal status. The
Plasterers Union, for example, had fewer than 100 black members out of 30,000 union
members. Johnson, supranote 38, at 114.
179. One law, banning the hiring of aliens on public works projects in NewYork, was passed
as early as 1870. 1870 N.Y. Laws 385.
180. See, e.g., 1897 N.Y. Laws 415, amended by 1899 N.Y. Laws 192, 567.
181. The laws sometimes specifically prohibited aliens from laboring on public works. E.g.,
City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 68 N.E. 786, 787 (111.1903); People v. Coler, 59 N.E. 716, 717 (N.Y.
1901); People v. Warren, 34 N.Y.S. 942, 943 (Sup. Ct. 1895). Some state provisions targeted
specific ethnic groups. E.g., Fx parte Kuback, 24 P. 737, 739 (Cal. 1890) (striking down law
banning use of Chinese workers on public works projects).
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State courts generally struck down these laws as violating liberty of
contract and creating illicit labor monopolies.' 82 In 1897, for
example, New York passed a law that required cities to pay prevailing
wages on public works contracts. 183 The law also gave preference to
state citizens, thus discriminating against large numbers of immigrants
and out-of-state residents, including black migrants from the
South.184 The New York Court of Appeals, taking what Roscoe
Pound called a "most extreme" view of liberty of contract, 18 declared the law to be unconstitutional.'8 6 The court pointed out that
the law discriminated against immigrants and those who could not
command the prevailing wage. 187 Of course, the law also discriminated against other disfavored workers, such as blacks, who were able
to gain employment only by underbidding union wages.
In 1903, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in Atkin v. Kansas'
held that regulations of labor on public works projects did not violate
contractors' freedom of contract because contractors were free to
refuse work in the first instance.189 While the scope of Atkin's
impact was not immediately clear,"g it soon became apparent that
the opinion destroyed any potential freedom-of-contract challenge to
public-work labor regulation. In 1904, for example, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed its previous position and held constitutional
a city ordinance
requiring payment of prevailing rates on public works
191
projects.
Most state courts, however, continued to overturn public works laws
that benefited union members by requiring payment of prevailing
wages or by requiring the hiring of union labor on public works
projects. The laws were struck down as wastes of taxpayers' money,19 2 as "class legislation,"'93 as legislation creating illicit monopo-

182. See, e.g., Kuback, 24 P. at 739 (stating public works law improperly limits contractual
freedom); Coler, 59 N.E. at 718 (holding wage scale unfairly discriminates against immigrants);
Warren, 34 N.Y.S. at 943 (stating law creates illegal monopoly for state citizens).
183. See 1897 N.Y. Laws 415, amended by 1899 N.Y. Laws 192, 567.
184. Coler, 59 N.E. at 718.
185. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract; 18 YALE L.J. 454, 477 (1909).
186. Coler, 59 N.E. at 718.
187. Id. at 716-17.
188. 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
189. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 210 (1903).
190. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cossey v. Grout, 72 N.E. 464, 469-70 (N.Y. 1904) (O'Brien, J.,
concurring) (stating that Atkin applies only to criminal cases).
191. Ryan v. City of New York, 69 N.E. 599, 602 (N.Y. 1904); see also Grout, 72 N.E. at 466
(holding that Atkin had affirmed prevailing wage legislation's constitutionality).
192. E.g., Fiske v. People, 58 N.E. 985, 986 (Ill. 1900) (rejecting mandatory union
employment as unconstitutional and economically unsound); Lewis v. Board of Educ., 102 N.W.
756, 757 (Mich. 1905) (describing union wage rate as artificially high); Wright v. Hoctor, 145
N.W. 704, 70809 (Neb. 1914) (rejecting union wage rate as cost ineffective); People v. Edgcomb,
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lies,1 94 as improper delegations of legislative authority to unions, 95
and as unfair exclusions of unskilled laborers from public construction work.196 These decisions benefited all of those who, like blacks,
were excluded from the politically powerful building-trade unions.
The Davis-BaconAct: conceived in bigotry
As of the late 1920s, most construction unions continued to exclude
The
blacks, while the rest discriminated against them.1 97
exclusionary unions included the Electrical Workers Union, which
counted practically none of the 1343 black electricians among its
142,000 members; the Plumbers and Steam Fitters, which included
none of the 3600 black plumbers among its 35,000 members; the
Plasterers Union, which had fewer than 100 blacks among its 30,000
members, despite 6000 blacks in the trade; and the Sheet Metal
which included no blacks among its 25,000-man memberWorkers,
19 8
ship.
In the absence of favorable legislation, however, construction
unions were not able to create a labor cartel strong enough to
exclude blacks from the industry. As of 1930, the construction
industry provided Southern blacks with more jobs than any industry
except agriculture and domestic service.199 Because the effects of
union and vocational-school discrimination did not reach unskilled
construction work,2"° blacks performed most of that work. In at
least six Southern cities, blacks composed more than eighty percent
of the unskilled construction labor force.2 °0
2.

98 N.Y.S. 965, 968-69 (App. Div. 1906) (stating that benefits of union wage rate are outweighed
by burden on taxpayer); Malette v. City of Spokane, 123 P. 1005, 1007 (Wash. 1912) (describing
union wage rate as unduly burdensome), revd, 137 P. 496 (Wash. 1913).
193. E.g., Fiske, 58 N.E. at 986 (holding ordinance requiring use of union labor to be
unconstitutional because it unduly benefited single class of labor); Wight, 145 N.W. at 706
(describing mandatory union wage scale as discriminatory).
194. E.g., Holden v. City of Alton, 53 N.E. 556, 556 (Il. 1899) (holding that when bidding
is restricted, an illegal monopoly is created); Adams v. Brenan, 52 N.E. 314, 316 (Ill. 1898)
(stating that by excluding a class of persons, legislation unfairly limits competition).
195. E.g., Adams, 52 N.E. at 317 (finding prevailing wage legislation to be beyond scope of
legislature's delegative power).
196. E.g., Wright, 145 N.W. at 706 (stating that legislation may not give union power to
exclude persons from labor pool).
197. See NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 6 (stating that craft unions that did not explicitly
exclude black workers still sanctioned discrimination by organizing black workers into separate
union locals). While these black unions were officially conferred status equal to that of white
unions, they remained at a "distinct disadvantage." Id.
198. Johnson, supra note 38, at 114.
199. Kruman, supra note 176, at 38.
200. SeeJohnson, supranote 38, at 114 (detailing strength of black participation in unskilled
construction market).
201. Kruman, supra note 176, at 38-39.
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By the mid-1920s, New York was one of the few states to still have
a public works law in effect. 20 2 In 1927, Representative Robert
Bacon of Long Island, New York, proposed H.R. 17,069, "A Bill to
Require Contractors and Subcontractors Engaged on Public Works of
the United States to Comply with State Laws Relating to Hours of
Labor and Wages of Employees on State Public Works." 20 3 Bacon's
action was spurred by an out-of-state contractor's successful bid to
build a Veteran's Bureau hospital in his district.214 The contractor,
Algernon Blair of Alabama, used nonunion black workers to build the
In response to Representative Bacon's complaints,
hospital. 0 5
Representative William Upshaw of Georgia stated, 'You will not think
that a southern man is more than human if he smiles over the fact of
your reaction to that real problem you are confronted with in any
community with a superabundance or large aggregation of negro
labor.

12' 06

In the years after he submitted his first prevailing wage bill, Bacon
and others introduced thirteen more bills to regulate labor on federal
public works projects. 2°7 Finally, a bill sponsored by Bacon and
Senator James J. Davis and supported by the AFL2 ° passed in
1931.2 ° The measure, commonly referred to as the Davis-Bacon
202. N.Y. LAB. LAw§ 220 (Consol. 1905); see also Campbell v. City of NewYork, 155 N.E. 628,
630 (N.Y. 1927) (upholding public works law). Judge Benjamin Cardozo, speaking for the court,
argued that the NewYork law prevented the "merciless exploitation of the indigent or the idle."
Campbell 155 N.E. at 631.
203. H.R. 17,069, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927).
204. See Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R 9232 Before the House Comm. on Labor,71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1930) [hereinafter Hearings on H.. 7995 and H.R. 9232] (letter of Ethelbert Stewart,
Commissioner of Labor Statistics) ("A contractor from a Southern State secured a contract to
build a Government marine hospital, as I remember it, on Long Island; that he brought with
him an entire outfit of Negro laborers from the South .... ").
205. Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works: Hearingson H.. 17069 Before the House Comm.
on Labor, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1927) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 17,069]; see also Hearings
on H.R 7995 and H.R 9232, supranote 204, at 17 (discussing intent behind wage bill).
206. Hearings on HI., 17,069,supra note 205, at 3.
207. Stuart Schulman, The Case Against the Davis-BaconAct GOv'T-UNION REV., Winter 1983,
at 23, 23.
208. See 74 CONG. REc. 6517 (1931) (remarks of Rep. McCormick) ("This type of legislation
has been agitated and urged for many years and has the united support of all elements of
organized labor, and particularly that great, progressive, and constructive labor organization, the
American Federation of Labor.").
209. Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§
276a to 276a-5 (1988)). The law provided:
That every contract in excess of $5,000 in amount, to which the United States or the
District of Columbia is a party which requires or involves the employment of laborers
or mechanics in the construction, alteration, and/or repair of any public buildings...
shall contain a provision to the effect that the rate of wage for all laborers and
mechanics employed by the contractor or any subcontractor on the public buildings
covered by the contract shall be not less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of
a similar nature in the city, town, village, or other civil division [in which the work is
taking place].
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Act, finally passed because congressmen saw the bill as a way of
protecting local unionized"' white workers' salaries in the fierce
labor market of the Depression.
According to a contemporary
source, black migration to the North "create[d] an oversupply of
certain types of building labor and . . . depress[ed] established
standards, even though no attempt was made to undercut prevailing
rates."

212

Indeed, the remarks of various Representatives demonstrate that
Davis-Bacon gained support as a protective measure for white labor.
In hearings on labor and public works in 1930, Representative John
J. Cochran of Missouri said, "I have received numerous complaints in
recent months about southern contractors employing low-paid colored
mechanics getting work and bringing the employees from the
South."2 1

Representative

Clayton

Allgood,

supporting

the

Davis-Bacon Act on the floor of the House, complained of "a
contractor from Alabama who went to New York with bootleg
labor."21 4 According to Allgood, "That contractor has cheap colored
labor that he transports, and he puts them in cabins, and it is labor
of that sort that it is in competition with white labor throughout the
country."2 1 Similar discriminatory sentiments were expressed to the
Senate. AFL President William Green, testifying in support of the
Davis-Bacon bill before the Senate Committee on Manufactures,
emphasized that "[clolored labor is being brought in to demoralize
wage rates." 6
The Davis-Bacon Act, which passed on March 3, 1931,1 severely
harmed black workers. 8 Within a few years of the Act's passage,
the Federal Government would embark on an ambitious public works

Id. § 2(a), 46 Stat. at 1494.
210. See ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., THE DAVIS-BACON ACT 8 (1975) [hereinafter THIEBLOT,
DAVIS-BACON ACT] (stating that bill was intended to help union labor).
211. See id.
at 8-10 (noting that mounting economic hardships of Depression created climate
in which this type of legislation could succeed); ROBERT C. WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR: A NATIONAL

PROBLEM 10 (1947) ("There was extreme competition for any and all jobs in construction...
212. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 24, at 178.
213. Hearingson H.R 7995 and H.R 9232, supra note 204, at 26-27.
214. 74 CONG. REc. 6513 (1931) (remarks of Rep. Allgood).
215. Id.
216. Wages of Laborers and Mechanics on Public Buildings: Hearings on S. 5904 Before the Senate
Comm. on Manufactures, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1931). For more evidence of the discriminatory
origins of the Davis-Bacon Act, see David E. Bernstein, The Davis-BaconAct: Vestige ofJim Crow,
14 NAT'L BLACK LJ. (forthcoming 1993).
217. Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931).
218. See THIEBLOT, DAVIS-BACON ACT, supra note 210 at 8-11 (stating that Davis-Bacon Act
wage scale barred blacks from gaining employment by underbidding whites).
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program in an effort to create jobs in the depths of the Depression." 9 In fact, the Federal Government would soon account for
half of all money spent on construction work.2 ' As discussed below,
a disproportionate share of federal construction jobs created by this
spending went to whites because of the Davis-Bacon Act.
The Act set a standard "prevailing" wage on federal construction
jobs.2 2' The only recourse blacks had in a labor market dominated
by exclusionary unions was their willingness to work for less money
than whites. The Act prohibited black workers from exercising that
advantage by setting a universal wage.
Moreover, the Act hurt blacks by encouraging contractors to hire
union labor. In 1935, Congress amended the Davis-Bacon Act to
reduce the minimum contract amount covered to $2000 and to
provide for predetermination of wages by the Department of
Labor.222 In response, the Department of Labor promulgated
regulations that remained largely unchanged until 1983.223 Under
these regulations, in any area in which labor was at least thirty percent
unionized, wages had to be paid at union scale. 224 According to
Davis-Bacon expert Armand Thieblot, Jr., this rule guaranteed that
almost all Davis-Bacon wages would be set according to union
wages.21 Because the union wage rule eliminated the economic
benefit of hiring nonunion labor, it made economic sense for
contractors to hire white union workers, who generally were more
highly skilled, directly through AFL local "hiring halls."226
Even contractors eligible to hire less expensive nonunion labor
often could not do so because of political pressures. If a contractor
did not hire union labor, well-organized union locals had the power
219. See THIEBLOT, DAvIs-BAcON Acr, supranote 210, at 11 (citing federal attempts to inject
life into depressed labor market).
220. See THIEBLOT, DAVIS-BACON ACT, supra note 210, at 13 (detailing massive federal
intervention in construction market).
221. See THIEBLOT, DAVIS-BACON ACT, supranote 210, at 14 (describing how prevailing wage
rate was set by reference to place where work was performed).
222. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 825, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1011 (1935).
223. ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION 40-43 (1986) [hereinafter
THIEBOLT, PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION] (discussing Department of Labor's response to 1935

Davis-Bacon amendment). The Secretary of Labor established a structure for selecting a rate
from those collected by survey of the existing workforce. Id. at 40-41. This method was the
Secretary's own creation, and a regulatory rather than a statutory provision. Id. at 41. It
remained informal until it was codified in 1952. See Procedures for Predetermination of Wage
Rates, 29 C.F.RI §§ 1.1-1.9 (1985).
224. Wage Rates, 29 C.F.R. at § 1.1; see also THIEBLOT, PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION, supra
note 223, at 41 (detailing impact of Department of Labor's 30% rule).
225.

THIEBLOT, DAVIS-BACON ACT, supra note 210, at 37-39; THIEBLOT, PREVAILING WAGE

LEGISLATION, supranote 223, at 40-43.
226. See WEAVER, supra note 211, at 12 (describing how union-wage rule excluded black
workers).
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to pressure the Department of Labor to "investigate" that contractor's
labor practices, a costly diversion even for a law-abiding contractor.2'

Local political pressure was exerted in favor of white union

labor as well.228
For these reasons, the vast majority of Davis-Bacon contractors
opted for union labor. Because the craft unions would not admit
blacks, those contractors rarely hired blacks for skilled or semiskilled
positions.2 1 To compound matters, already-weak black AFL local
unions, which could have provided at least a few unionized skilled
construction jobs for blacks, did not survive the economic downturn;
many of them had simply ceased to exist.2

°

Ironically, considering

that Congress supposedly passed the Act to protect local workers,
unions insisted that employers bring in nonlocal union labor rather
than hire local nonunion blacks.
In perhaps the most devastating blow to black construction workers,
Davis-Bacon Act regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor
never recognized categories of unskilled workers in training for skilled
positions other than apprentices, even in the rare instances when such
categories were sanctioned by local craft union rules. Unions of
unskilled construction workers sometimes admitted blacks, but job
categories and wage levels mandated by Davis-Bacon both discouraged
contractors from hiring unskilled workers who were not in union
apprenticeship programs, and prevented them from getting trained
if hired.21 1 Because union-sponsored apprenticeship programs that
did provide training almost never admitted blacks, black construction
workers were, at best, relegated to unskilled jobs on Davis-Bacon
projects.

23 2

The Davis-Bacon Act had immediate and vicious discriminatory
effects on black construction workers that persist, albeit in milder

227. See WEAVER, supra note 211, at 12 (describing political pressure to exclude black
workers).
228. See WEAVER, supra note 211, at 12 (detailing widespread discriminatory influence of
white union lobby).
229. Historically, even unbiased employers would often be forced to hire only whites because
of craft union hostility toward blacks. SeeWESLEY, supranote 27, at 236 (describing how violent
community pressures to hire whites exacerbated black exclusion from craft trades).
230. See NORTHRuP, supra note 46, at 32.
231.

THIEBLOT, DAVIS-BACON ACT, supranote 210, at 46-47; see THIEBLOT, PREVAILING WAGE

LEGISLATION, supra note 223, at 59 (stating that failure to implement "helper" classification
forced contractors to pay their helpers the "journeyman" rate in accordance with union craft
rules).
232. NORTHRuP, supra note 46, at 38. Moreover, because of discrimination in union and
public vocational school training programs, blacks generally acquired skills through unskilled
employment and on-the-job training. Id. As noted above, the Davis-Bacon regulations greatly
limited such opportunities.
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form, today. 3 The Act provides another example of how the rise
of pre-New Deal federal economic regulation, combined with judicial
restraint in economic matters, severely harmed blacks economically.
No legal challenge was ever brought against the Act, probably because
Atkin 3 4 and an earlier case upholding a federal maximum hours
law235 made the possibility of a successful challenge on economic
liberty grounds by contractors seem remote. The NAACP, which
could have filed a civil rights challenge to the Act on behalf of black
construction workers, had made an ideological decision not to
challenge labor legislation in the courts."SS In addition, at least
some black leaders thought that the major significance of the Act was
not its exclusion of black workers from public works projects, but the
fact that the few blacks who were able to obtain jobs on public works
as whites, thus weakening the racial
projects were paid the same wages
37
wage differential in the South.
C. A Taste of Things to Come
As discussed above, when courts enforced laissez-faire labor policies
in the railroad and construction industries, they protected blacks from
the threat of monopolization by racist labor unions. With the decline
of laissez-faire jurisprudence came the rise of discriminatory labor
legislation that drove blacks out of the railroad industry and
marginalized them in the construction industry. Legislation passed
during the New Deal dealt the decisive blows to blacks in those
occupations.
But the Railway Labor Act and the Davis-Bacon Act were mere
previews of things to come. While those laws affected only a small
segment of black labor, labor legislation that originated in the
National Industrial Recovery Act of the New Deal was to have
disastrous consequences of a far greater magnitude on black workers.
Eventual judicial acquiescence to this legislation was substantially
responsible for a persistent increase in black unemployment that has
continued to this day.

233. For a study of the long-term effects of Davis-Bacon, see Bernstein, supra note 216.
234. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing Atkin v. Kansas).
235. United States v. Garbish, 222 U.S. 257, 261 (1911) (upholding federal eight-hour
workday rule).
236. RAYMOND WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 122-23 (1971) [hereinafter
WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION].
237. See WEAvER, supra note 211, at 14 (examining union wage scale and opining that

standard wages could be catalyst for racial equality).
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NEW DEAL LABOR LEGISLATION AS A CAUSE OF PERSISTENT
BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT

Legal scholars generally agree that the New Deal's shift from
limited National Government to the current regime had favorable
effects on black welfare. Owen Fiss, for example, credits the New
Deal's triumph over the Old Court with planting the seeds of the
"Second Reconstruction." 8 Historians generally concur, at least
with regard to the post-1935 "Second New Deal." 23 9 One author
applauds the New Deal as the cause of the emergence of civil rights
as a national issue.2'
Scholars who share this enthusiasm neglect some pertinent facts.
Civil rights emerged as a national issue during the New Deal not
because the New Dealers had particular sympathy for blacks'
aspirations, but because for the first time since the abolition of
slavery, blacks were confronted with broad-based discriminatory labor
legislation enforced by the Federal Government. 241 Not only did
New Deal labor laws fail to take account of the interests of blacks,
they were enforced in a discriminatory manner and did not contain
any civil rights provisions to help blacks overcome the discriminatory
effects of the Government's cartelization of the labor market in favor
of white workers. Only the Supreme Court's willingness to enforce
the Constitution's restraints on federal power could have prevented
the tragic results. But by 1937 the Court had acquiesced to the New
Deal and had left blacks at the mercy of the political winds. 42
Fortunately for blacks, the political winds shifted in the ensuing
thirty years sufficiently to permit them to salvage the tremendous civil
rights victories of the 1950s and 1960s. Nonetheless, as will be

238. Owen M. Fiss, Essays Commemorating the One Hundreth Anniversay of the Harvard Law
Review: Why the State, 100 HARV. L REV. 781, 781 (1987) (arguing that hands-off government
policy perpetuates entrenched racial bias). This is also a major theme of Volume I of RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLEJuSTICE (1975).
239. See, e.g., 1 HARvARD SFFKoFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKs: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL IsSUE 58, 330-35 (1978) (citing New Deal as impetus behind civil rights

movement).
240. Id. at 1-2 (characterizing New Deal as promoting civil rights).
241. Cf James S. Olsen, Race, Class, and Progress, in BLACK LABOR IN AMERICA 153, 153-55
(Milton Cantor ed., 1970) (detailing how New Deal legislation maintained racial barriers).
242. In United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), the Court
suggested that it would be willing to protect "discrete and insular minorities" if Congress passed
legislation that prejudiced the political process for minorities. Id. The Roosevelt Court thus
hinted that it would not withdraw entirely from judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation because of the danger minorities faced from a strong interventionist government.
Id.at 152-53 n.4. Unlike laissez-fairejurisprudence, however, application of the CaroleneProducts
dictum could not protect blacks from New Deal labor legislation that had subtle discriminatory
intent and indirect discriminatory effects.
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demonstrated below, the discriminatory effects of the New Deal linger
on.
A.

The National IndustrialRecovery Act

The National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA),24 passed during the
famous first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration, had the
potential to permanently cripple black labor. As a 1930s civil rights
activist pointed out, the NRA served to redistribute employment and
resources from blacks-the most destitute of Americans suffering
Had the Supreme
from the Depression-to the white masses.2
Court not declared it unconstitutional in 1935,245 the NRA might
have consigned blacks to permanent second-class legal and economic
status.
The discriminatoryeffects of NRA wage provisions
The NRA established a system of wage codes that required
businesses to pay certain categories of workers a set wage.246 The
Act also established price codes designed to compensate for the
higher wages."' The codes were determined by joint labor-business
2 48
panels, with labor generally represented by exclusionary unions.
The NRA wage provisions discriminated against blacks in a variety
of ways. First, blacks were excluded from the wage and hours benefits
of the NRA because of their concentration in agriculture and
domestic service, two areas in which codes were not established. 49
Blacks' wages remained the same while the NRA forced prices up.
Second, even within an industry generally covered by NRA, some
codes provided that certain jobs in an industry would be covered by
NRA while others would not.2 ° Not surprisingly, the occupational
classifications frequently were arranged so that minimum wage scales
1.

243.

National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).

The Supreme Court

would later declare the NRA unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
244. John P. Davis, NRA Codfies Wage Slavery, 41 THE CRisis 298, 301-02 (1934).
245. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
246. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. at 195; see a~oWOLTERS, NEGROES AND
THE DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 124-25 (detailing wage code provisions).
247. See WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supranote 236, at 124-25 (detailing price
code provisions).
248. Davis, supra note 244, at 298; see also VAN DEUSEN, supra note 41, at 82 (noting that
union predominance tended to diminish black workers' bargaining power).
249. SrrKoFF, supra note 239, at 54; seeWOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supra note

236, at 149-51 (describing NRA exclusion of large percentage of black labor force).
250.

See WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 125 (stating that codes

were drafted to specifically benefit white-dominated occupations).
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only covered work generally performed by whites." 1 When a black
employee performed the same task as a white employee, and even
when he performed more important tasks, he would often have a
lower job classification for NRA purposes. 2 Thus, the NRA codified wage differentials between white and black workers." s

The NRA also contained grandfather clauses providing that
minimum wage scales for some classes of labor should be based on
wages received as of a certain date in the past.'
Many black
leaders believed that the Government implemented the rule in such
a way as to discriminate against unskilled black workers.2 5
Even when blacks received equal treatment under the NRA, they
often suffered. The Act forced white employers to pay blacks and
whites an equal wage, but it did not force employers to hire blacks.
Some employers who had hired black labor because it was cheaper
simply dismissed their black workers rather than pay NRA code
wages, 6 replacing them with whites. 7 Still other employers,
including some that employed blacks exclusively, could not afford to
pay NRA wages." 8 They therefore eliminated menial jobs often
held by blacks, especially young blacks, such as office boy and grocery
deliverer. 9 Industrial firms that employed blacks but that used
obsolete machinery either closed or bought modem machinery to
replace black labor.Y White employers also faced the possibility of

251. SrrKoFF, supra note 239, at 54 (stating that widespread manipulation of job
classifications created gap between white and black wages); WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE
DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 124-25 (discussing gerrymandering of work classifications).

252.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supranote 236, at 125 (describing invidious

use of NRA wage scales); see also Davis, supra note 244 (criticizing Southern wage differential).
But see Gustav Peck, The Negro Worker and the NAT, 41 THE CRISIS 279, 282 (1934) (defending
Southern wage differential).
253. Davis, supranote 244, at 301-02.

254.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra note 236, at 130-31 (detailing how

grandfather clauses froze future wages at past wage rates, holding black wage rates at level
historically lower than white wage rates).

255. See WOLTERS,

NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra note 236, at 130-31.

256. See SrrKOFF, supra note 239, at 54 (describing how black labor was unable to compete
if forced to accept employment at prevailing rate).

257.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra note 236, at 117-18 (stating minimum

wage left black labor vulnerable to discrimination); Gaston, supra note 83, at 404, 407
(describing effect of NRA on blacks in Georgia); Arthur F. Raper, The Southern Negro and the
NRA, 64 GA. HIST. Q. 128, 135 (1980) (stating many black workers were displaced by whites, or
"thrown out of work by the discontinuation of marginal businesses").

258. See WOLTERS,

NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra note 236, at 118 (describing how

budget restrictions caused some employers to cut workforce); Gaston, supranote 83, at 406-12
(noting that NRA caused much black unemployment in Georgia). In some instances, the code
wages in Georgia brought about a five-fold increase in black wages. Id.
259. Raper, supranote 257, at 138.

260.
at 118.

SrrKoFF, supranote

239, at 54; WOLTERS, NEGROES AND

THE DEPRESSION,

supranote 236,
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private, anonymous violence if they hired blacks, 6 1 and the minimum wage laws gave them one less reason to take the risk.
Concerned members of the black community and others quickly
recognized the harmful effects of NRA-imposed minimum wages on
black workers."' Southern industrialists called for the Government
to set a reduced minimum wage for blacks in order to preserve their
companies' competitiveness and their workers' jobs;2 63 with some
merit, they accused Northern industrialists of purposely supporting a
relatively high, uniform wage scale in order to retard the flight of
low-wage industries to the South."S While most black leaders
opposed wage differential schemes,26 growing numbers of blacks
endorsed wage differentials in order to stem the rising tide of black
unemployment as the disemployment effects of the NRA became
apparent.Y A critic of wage differentials summed up their appeal:
"Negroes have lost jobs as a result of the NRA, and a lower wage for

261. WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 119 (describing climate of
fear created by white workers in an attempt to exclude black competition).
262. Davis, supra note 244, at 303 (discussing black criticism of NRA wage scale); Julian
Harris, Whites Oust Negro Under N.RA. in South, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1933, at E6 (stating that
NRA wage scales harmed blacks because "whites would gradually usurp the places held by
Negroes"); T. Arnold Hill, The Emergency Is On!, 11 OPPORTUNITY 280, 284 (1933) (warning that
NRA wage scales amounted to "economic slavery"); Robert C. Weaver, A Wage DifferentialBased
on Race, 41 THE CRISIS 236,242-43 (1934) [hereinafter Weaver, WageDifferential] ("The minimum
wage regulations of the NRA... resulted in wholesale discharges [of black workers] in certain
areas.").
The minimum wage provisions of the NRA originally had earned broad support among black
leaders. Opportunity, the Journal of the National Urban League, declared that "a minimum wage
... and maximum hours of work ... will be of immeasurable benefit to ... Black workers who
are unskilled and confined to the lowest paid jobs in the industrial system." Robert Bell,
Minimum Wage and the Black Worker, 11 OPPORTUNITY 199, 202 (1933). This attitude was "widely

held" in the black community.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra note 236, at 94.

263. See Gaston, supra note 83, at 405-06 (recalling Georgia employers' push for separate
minimum wage for black workers); cf Ira D. A. Reid, Black Wages for Black Workers, 12
OPPORTUNriY 72, 73-74 (1934) (stating that NRA wage scale destroyed economic incentive to
hire blacks).

264.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra note 236, at 147 (citing criticism of

discriminatory motives underlying high uniform wage scales).
265. E.g., Weaver, Wage Differential supra note 262, at 236-44 (appraising wage differentials
as institutionalized discrimination). Black leaders opposed race-based wage differentials either
because they did not want the government to institutionalize discrimination or because they
thought it would inhibit solidarity between white and black workers. WOLTERS, NEGROES AND
THE DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 103-04 (citing opposition to wage differential schemes).
Black organizations formed the Joint Committee for Economic Recovery to monitor and protest
discrimination in the NRA. Largely because of its pressure, no explicit racial wage differentials
were ever implemented. See id. at 112-13 (detailing anticipatory measures against wage
differentials).
266. Gaston, supra note 83, at 406. Blacks taking this position were referred to as "Black
Judas." Id. For example, black representatives from the Tuskegee Institute petitioned the
National Recovery Administration to allow a plant that shut down because of its inability to pay

code wages to reopen and pay subcode wages.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,

supra

note 236, at 121-22 (describing how harsh economic realities forced some blacks to advocate
racial schemes).
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them would counteract this tendency. It would assure Negroes of
retaining their old jobs and perhaps it would lead to a few additional
ones."" Despite the fact that the NRA existed for only about two
years, an architect of the law estimated that its minimum wage
provisions put 500,000 additional blacks out of work.2" The only
respite blacks got from the law was the incompetence of the Government in enforcing it. 9
2.

The discriminatory effects of NRA union provisions

The NRA granted exclusive bargaining power to discriminatory
unions by certifying them as exclusive bargaining agents. Section 7a
of the NRA provided:
(1) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives
(2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be
required as a condition of employment to join any company union
or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; ....270

In 1933, before passage of the NRA, American unions could claim
a membership of only two and a quarter million, of which only
Section 7a and its successor, the
seventy thousand were black.7

267. Weaver, Wage Differential supranote 262, at 238; see also WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE
DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 102-03 (criticizing acceptance of wage differentials as shortsighted and destructive to pursuit of economic equality). Many black intellectuals argued that
it was better for blacks to be fired than to accept lower wages than whites. E.g., Hill, supra note
262, at 284; Weaver, Wage DifferentiaI supranote 262, at 238.
268. CHARLES F. RooS, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 173 (1937). Others consider such
estimates excessive because the NRA lasted only two years and was widely circumvented. E.g.,
WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 214 (taking conservative view of
NRA effect on black labor).
269. Cf WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supranote 236, at 147 (stating that blacks
'benefitted from the NRA's inability and unwillingness to enforce its wage and hour
provisions"). Blacks retained jobs covered by NRA codes by illicitly accepting wages below code
rates or by officially becoming independent contractors, which excluded them from NRA
coverage. See Raper, supranote 257, at 134, 139-41 (describing attempts to circumvent NRA
codes). Ironically, many blacks in Georgia enthusiastically supported the codes and took part
in the effort to convince the public to only patronize establishments that obeyed the code. It
should be noted, however, that these blacks often added an additional stipulation: "Don't buy
where you can't work." Gaston, supranote 83, at 302-05.
270. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7, 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933).
271. JuliusJacobson, Union Conservatism: A Barierto RacialEqualiy, in THE NEGRO AND THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1, 4 (Julius Jacobson ed., 1968); see also Marc Karson & Ronald
Radosh, The American Federationof Laborand the Negro Worker, 1894-1949, in THE NEGRO AND THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, supra, at 155, 162 (noting that racial barriers kept blacks out of
labor unions).
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Wagner Act,2 72 rescued the unions from further decline and ulti-

mate irrelevance. In a two-month period after the passage of the
NRA, AFL membership rose from a little over two million to almost
2 73

four million.

This growth in union strength led to widespread displacement of
black workers as racist labor unions took advantage of the monopoly
power granted to them by the NRA. A 1934 editorial in the NAACP's
journal The Crisis noted:
Daily the problem of what to do about union labor or even about
a chance to work, confronts the Negro workers of the country...
Seeking to avail itself of the powers granted under section 7A of the
NRA, union labor strategy seems to be to form a union in a given
plant, strike to obtain the right to bargain with the employers as the
sole representative of labor, and then to close the union
to black
27 4
workers, effectively cutting them off from employment.
Roy Wilkins of the NAACP asserted that the AFL's strategy was to
use section 7a "to organize a union for all the workers, and to either
agree with the employers to push Negroes out of the industry or,
having effected an agreement with the employer, to proceed to make
the union lily-white."2 75 Not surprisingly, spokesmen for the black
community "vigorously opposed" section 7a.276 W.E.B. Du Bois, for
example, argued that the NRA reinforced the "sinister power" of the
AFL. 277

Despite complaints directed to the National Labor Relations Board,
the Federal Government declined to intervene on behalf of
blacks.2 ' s The only relief that blacks received from section 7a was
that many employers used it to encourage the organization of
company unions in place of independent AFL unions.2 79 Because
company unions generally did not discriminate on the basis of race,

272. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
273.

HORACE R. CAYrON

& GEORGE S. MrrcHEu,

BLAcKWORKERS AND THE NEW UNIONS 123

(1939).
274. Union Labor Again, THE CRISIS, Nov. 1934, at 300.
275. Raymond Wolters, Section 7a and the Black Worker, 10 LAB. HIST. 459, 466 (1969)
[hereinafter Wolters, Section 7a] (quoting Roy Wilkins).
276. HILL, BLACK LABOR, supranote 17, at 101 (noting that NAACP, National Urban League,
and other black organizations were strongly opposed to Section 7a); Wolters, Section 7a,supra
note 275, at 471 (recounting opposition of T. Arnold Hill, Dean Kelly Miller, Roy Wilkins, and
Harry E. Davis).
277. WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supranote 236, at 176 (quoting W.E.B. Du
Bois).
278. See, e.g.,JESSE T. MOOREJR., A SEARCH FOR EQUALITY. THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE,
1910-1961, at 82 (1981) (noting that strike by AFL, that was conducted so that blacks would be
expelled from Wehr Steel Foundry, met with ambivalence on part of NLRB).
279. Wolters, Section 7a, supranote 275, at 469.
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the average black worker had a far more favorable attitude than the
average white toward such unions."s Many black leaders shared this
favorable attitude, at least until the mid-1930s when the seemingly
racially progressive Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) came
21
into being.
NRA: "Negroes Ruined Again?!"
Because of the negative effects of the NRA on blacks, the NRA was
very unpopular among them. The black press referred to the NRA as
"Negro Run Around," "Negroes Ruined Again," "Negroes Rarely
Allowed," "Negro Removal Act," "Negroes Robbed Again," and "No
Roosevelt Again."282 A contemporary newspaper noted that for
blacks the symbolic NRA Blue Eagle "may be... a predatory bird
instead of a feathered messenger of happiness."283 As one historian
has observed, "[F]ew blacks gained much more than a raise in their
cost of living from the NRA." 284 Professor Herbert Hill notes that
" It] he legislation intended to be the keystone of President Roosevelt's
program to protect and uplift the working2 class had ... become a
millstone around the Black worker's neck." 8
Roosevelt administration spokesmen tried to defend the NRA to
blacks by pointing out that it led to the acceptance of the forty-hour
work week, the enactment of minimum wage legislation, the swifter
28 6
end of child labor, and the promotion of collective bargaining.
While the New Dealers may have had the best of humanitarian
motives, none of these interferences in the labor market helped the
average black worker, and altogether their primary effect was to
increase the level of unemployment among blacks. 7
3.

The Demise and Resurrection of the NRA
Fortunately for blacks, the Supreme Court declared the NRA to be
unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States.2 While New Deal circles mourned this day as "Black
B.

280. Wolters, Section 7a, supra note 275, at 469.
281. CAYrON & MITCHELL, supra note 273, at 62.
282. SrrKoFF, supranote 239, at 55.
283. Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., The Negro in the New Deal Era, in THE NEGRO IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR 7, 11 (Bernard Sternsler ed., 1969).
284. SorrOFF, supra note 239, at 54-55; see also Gaston, supra note 83, at 404 (noting that
contemporary black leaders claimed that rise in cost of living outweighed any gains they may
have received in wages from NRA).
285. HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 100.
286.

WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supra note 236, at 154.

287.
288.

See supranote 268 and accompanying text (discussing rise in black unemployment).
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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The two most
Monday,"" 9 the black community celebrated.'
harmful parts of the NRA resurfaced, however, in subsequent
legislation that left hundreds of thousands of blacks permanently
unemployed.
1.

The National Labor RelationsAct

Section 7a of the NRA became section 9 of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, popularly known as the Wagner Act."' The
Wagner Act established labor unions as exclusive collective bargaining
agents through a process of governmental certification by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).1 2 Like section 7a, section
9 gave organized labor legitimacy within the legal structure and
increased its power enormously-total union membership rose to over
eight million by 1941.29 The Wagner Act also banned company
unions, making it even more harmful to blacks than section 7a had
been. 94
Section 9 of the Wagner Act provided: "Representatives designated
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representative of all employees in such unit." 5 This
meant that if the majority of workers in a unit desired union
representation, the Wagner Act gave a single union exclusive power
to make agreements regarding their wages, hours, and working
conditions. The union would then often establish a "closed shop,"
excluding non-union members from employment.
As originally proposed, the Wagner Act had contained a clause
prohibiting unions from discriminating against blacks or excluding
them from unions.2 96 Black leaders believed this clause to be of

289. MELVIN I. UROFsKY, THE MARCH OF LIBER"Y:
UNITED STATES 671 (1988).
290. HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 100.

A CONSTITLTIONAL HISTORY OF THE

291. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 9, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
292. See id. ("Representatives designated... for... collective bargaining... shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit.... .").
293. Edna Bonacich, Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States:
A SplitLaborMarket Interpretation,41 AM. SOC. REv. 34,46 (1976) [hereinafter Bonacich, Advanced
Capitalism].
294. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 9,49 Stat. at 453; see Wolters, Section 7a, supra
note 275, at 469 (noting that company unions were least harmful to blacks because they
generally did not discriminate).
295. § 9, 49 Stat. at 453.
296. Raymond Wolters, Closed Shop and White Shop: The Negro Response to Collective Bargaining,
1933-1935, in BLACK LABOR IN AMERICA 137, 149 (Milton Cantor ed., 1969).
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critical importance. 7 For example, Dean Kelly Miller of Howard
University predicted "the doom of the Negro in American industry"
if the Wagner Act did not contain a clause protecting blacks. 98 But
Senator Wagner succumbed to AFL pressure and dropped the clause
in order to retain union support and secure the bill's passage.399
Blacks initially viewed the Wagner Act with considerable hostility
because it gave government sanction to racially biased labor agreements negotiated under it.'
The closed union shop, noted one
critic, is really the white union shop."0 ' Moreover, to the extent that
the Wagner Act succeeded in raising wages and labor standards
beyond market levels, it had the same effect as a minimum wage law
in eliminating marginal black jobs."° In a memorandum to President Roosevelt, the National Urban League warned that the Wagner
03
Act was a "serious threat to the job security of Negro workers."
The Act led to the unionization of previously unorganized industrial
workers in CIO unions. Much to the relief of black leaders, few CIO
unions explicitly discriminated against blacks. Many did, however,
discriminate in more subtle ways, particularly by keeping blacks out
of apprenticeship programs that led to skilled jobs."'
To the extent that it was enforced, the CIO's general non-discrimination policy did little to protect black workers, and in some ways it
hurt them. Unlike the craft trades, where AFL unions served as their
own employment agents, industrial employers were solely responsible
for hiring unionized industrial workers. °5 CIO leaders supported
equal pay for all similarly situated workers in order to serve their own

297. See id. (noting that without clause, many blacks would lose their jobs and be shut out
of unions controlled by whites).
298. Id.
299. PHILIP FONER, supranote 15, at 215 (noting that without union support, bill would not
have passed); cf SITKOFF, supranote 239, at 52 (noting that "[tihe great majority of New Dealers
accepted discrimination against blacks as an inevitable cost of economic recovery").
300. HILL, BuAcm LABOR, supra note 17, at 100.
301. Wolters, Section 7a, supranote 275, at 41 (quoting Roy Wilkins).
302. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 398 (1944).
303. NANCYJ. WEISS, THE NATIONAL URBAN LFAGUE, 1910-1940, at 273 (1974) (quoting
National Urban League memorandum).
304. WILLIAM B. GouLD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 21,263, 371-72 (1977); HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 190 (observing that
blacks were left with unskilled jobs and no training to improve status); see also Hill, The AFL-CIO
and the Black Worker, supra note 167, at 14 (noting history of union discrimination against
blacks); Sumner M. Rosen, The CIO Era, 1935-1955, in THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 188, 200-02 (JuliusJacobsen ed., 1968) (noting discrimination in CIO unions). See
generally Herbert Hill, Myth-Making as Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine Workers
ofAmerlca, 2 INT'LJ. OF POL, CULTURE, & SOCY 132, 134-36 (1988) (observing that blacks were
allowed into unions but were relegated to only unskilled positions so as not to "threaten[]
seriously the position of the white workers").
305. Rosen, supranote 304, at 200-01.
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interest: that is, to prevent blacks from undercutting union wages."
Few CIO unions expended any energy in preventing their
employers from discriminating in hiring.0 7 In the absence of
pressure on employers from either the Government or the unions to
institute a nondiscriminatory hiring policy, the CIO's equal wage
policy encouraged employers to favor whites for employment.'
Blacks who were able to secure CIO jobs were perhaps better off in
that they received equal pay,"m but many others were left unemployed.
The newly restrained New Deal Court upheld the Wagner Act in
1937,3" ° even though it was widely thought to be unconstitutional at
Despite a 1944 decision requiring unions
the time of its passage.'

306. See Rosen, supra note 304, at 200-01 (noting that blacks would otherwise fill jobs and
work for market wages rather than artificially high union wages).
307. NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 232-33 (listing tobacco, textile, clothing, laundry,
longshoremen, and other unions as admitting workers without regard to race, but permitting
employers complete freedom in job assignments).
308. WEAVER, supra note 211, at 139. Weaver explained:
(E]mployers have historically been willing to hire Negroes in preference to whites
because of racial wage differentials and because Negroes were considered to be
safeguards against unionism. The great transformation wrought by the New Deal, the
CIO, and the Second World War eliminated this factor, however, because it virtually
abolished racial wage differentials and changed the anti-union attitudes of important
Negro leaders.
Id.
In the late 1930s, even a nonprejudiced employer may have had incentives for maintaining
an all-white workforce if she had to pay all workers the same wage. For example, a homogenous
workforce would limit potentially costly racial strife at the workplace and would encourage
prejudiced whites to seek employment there. Some observers have also argued that blacks were
paid less because of lower vocational skills, rather than discrimination. For example, a 1938 U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics study found that blacks earned less than whites in the iron and steel
industries not because of discrimination, but because of lower skills. Robert Higgs, Black
Progress and the Peristence of Racial Economic Inequalities, 1865-1940, in THE QUESTION OF
DISCRIMINATION 9, 18 (William Darity, Jr. & Steven Shulman eds., 1989) ("A very careful
examination of the reports for plants employing both whites and Negroes revealed that
whenever whites and Negroes were found in the same occupations in any given plant, both were
receiving the same basic rate."). The objectivity of that report, of course, is open to question.
309. It is also possible that many of these workers were worse off. For example, assume that
in a certain factory, workers in unskilled categories received $1.00 an hour, while those hired
for intermediate skills categories received $1.50. Because an employer had to pay whites and
blacks equally, he would hire only white workers for both positions if the skills of available black
and white workers were equal. See supra note 308. He would, however, be willing to hire black
workers with intermediate skills as unskilled workers at $1.00 an hour. Black workers in a
situation such as this would have been better off if they were paid, for example, $1.35 an hour
in the absence of an equal pay rule. This hypothetical illustrates the perverse effect that equalpay rules would have on racial distribution in an average workforce in the absence of a civil
rights mandate, and may help explain why New Deal labor legislation led to the perpetuation,
indeed the ossification, of racial job categories. Cf HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 96 n.*.
("The Federal Government's failure to enforce public policy declarations of nondiscrimination
in employment at the beginning of the period of vast government involvement in the national
economy has been a major factor in the perpetuation of racial job patterns.")
310. NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
311. MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 125 (1984).
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granted exclusive bargaining rights under the Wagner Act to
represent all workers in the bargaining group,32 blacks would have
to wait until the civil rights era (and beyond) before they could get
fair treatment from unions that benefited from privileges granted by
government.
Blacks also had to wait until the 1960s for the NLRB to invalidate
unfair union practices. The NLRB did rule as early as 1945 that the
statutory bargaining agent must represent all employees without
discrimination.3 13 Nevertheless, the Board added that segregation
and exclusion of blacks from membership did not constitute unfair
representation." 4 It was not until 1962 that the NLRB granted relief
to a claimant based on a union's failure to meet its duty of fair
representation.3 1 5 In 1964, the Board finally held that racial dis316
crimination is an unfair labor practice under the Wagner Act.
2.

The FairLabor Standards Act

While section 7a of the NRA reappeared as the Wagner Act, the
minimum wage provisions of the NRA were reincarnated as the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 7 Like the NRA minimum
wage, the FLSA had two negative effects on blacks. First, it was
intentionally applied unevenly, so that it failed to cover many black
workers.318 Second, the FLSA created massive unemployment for
blacks when it was applied to them.
The minimum wage law created black unemployment in part
because it prevented unskilled black workers from underbidding their

312. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
313. Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1083 (1945) (holding that "there is a duty on
the statutory bargaining agent to represent all members of the unit equally and without
discrimination, on the basis of race, color or creed"); see also Veneer Prods., Inc., 81 N.L.R.B.
492, 494 (1948) (holding that equal representation must be afforded to all members of unit
regardless of race). See generally Michael Jordan, TheNLRB RaalDiscriminationDecisions, 19351964: TheEmpiricProcess of Administrationand the InnerEye ofRacism, 24 CONN. L REV. 55 (1991)
(reviewing decisions of NLRB and concluding that administration of Wagner Act and TaftHartley Act served to institutionalize racism).
314. See Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.LR.B. 973, 975 (1945) (holding that segregation of
blacks and whites into separate "locals" is not a per se form of racial discrimination).
315. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.LR.B. 181,190 (1962) (holding that discrimination unrelated
to union membership is nonetheless sufficient to support finding of unfair labor practices by
employer and union), enforcement denied NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
316. Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No.1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573,1594 (1964); see also
Jordan, supranote 313, at 95 (asserting that Independent Metal Workers only "acknowledge [d] ...
what blacks had known for decades").
317. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988)).
318. MYRDAL, supranote 302, at 398; Gaston, supra note 83, at 413; Marc Linder, Farm Workers
and the FairLabor StandardsAct: RacialDiscriminationin the New Dea4 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1336
(1987).
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It also reduced the general incentive of

employers to hire unskilled workers, who were disproportionately
black, as the price differential between skilled and unskilled labor
declined. 2 ° Most important, the FLSA led to the elimination of
many jobs held by blacks that paid less than the statutory minimum.

The harshest disemployment effects of the FLSA were felt by blacks
in the South because they were most likely to work in jobs that paid
less than the government-imposed minimum wage. 2' The Labor
Department reported in 1938 that "between 30,000 and 50,000
workers [mostly southern blacks] lost their jobs because of the
minimum wage within two weeks of the Fair Labor Standards Act's
imposition." 22

The law did not have as dramatic an effect as it

might have had in the medium term. By 1939, the Public Works
Administration provided temporary employment to about one million
blacks, 23 and by the time the Supreme Court upheld the FLSA in
1941,324 the Depression-era labor surplus was replaced with a
wartime labor shortage.-"
By 1943, however, economist Gunnar Myrdal, in his famous study
of black Americans, was able to predict the negative effects that the

319. As economist Harold Demsetz explains:
A minimum wage law prevents a non-preferred person from offering his services for
a lower wage than is received by his preferred (but equally productive) fellow worker.
A lower request by, or a lower market-wage for, the non-preferred job applicant offers
wealth compensation to discriminating employers that will reduce their consumption
of discrimination.
Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the Marketplace 43 N.C. L. REV. 271, 276 (1965).
320. The following hypothetical explains this concept. Assume that an employer must
choose between hiring one skilled worker and two unskilled workers, or hiring two skilled
workers. The productivity of either combination of workers will be the same. Without the
minimum wage law, the unskilled workers would each earn twenty-five cents an hour, the skilled
workers sixty cents an hour. The profit-maximizing employer would obviously choose the first
option, which would save it ten cents an hour. But if the minimum wage were increased to
thirty-five cents, the employer would save ten cents an hour by choosing the second option.
This result explains why organized labor, even though it represents few unskilled workers who
earn wages close to the statutory minimum, continues to support minimum wage laws-skilled
union workers become more economical.
321. MYRDAL, supra note 302, at 398; see also NORTHRUP, supra note 46, at 93-94 (explaining
that minimum wage hurt blacks in Southern railroad industry). The AFL took credit for the
failure of the FLSA to provide for a lower minimum wage in the South. Elizabeth Brandeis,
Organized Labor and Protective Labor Legislation, in LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL 195, 228 (Milton
Derber & Edwin Young eds., 1957).
322. William A. Keyes, The Minimum Wage and the Davis-Bacon Act. Employment Effects on
Minorities and Youth, 3J. LAB. RES. 399, 401 (1982).
323.

ELi GINZBERG & ALFRED S. EICHNER, THE TROUBLESOME PRESENCE:

AMERICAN

DEMOCRACY AND THE NEGRO 297 (1964).
324. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 111 (1941).
325. Blacks also benefited from the wartime Fair Employment Practices Commission, which
enforced civil rights norms in war industries. LOuis RuCHAiES, RACE,JoBs, AND PoLiCS: THE
STORY OF THE FEPC 22, 45 (1953).
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FLSA was to have on postwar black employment, particularly in the
South:
As low wages and sub-standard labor conditions are most prevalent
in the South, this danger [of unemployment] is mainly restricted
to Negro labor in that region. When the jobs are made better, the
employer becomes less eager to hire Negroes, and white workers
become more eager to take the jobs from the Negroes. There is,
in addition, the possibility that the policy of setting minimum
standards might cause some jobs to disappear altogether or to
become greatly decreased. What has earlier been replaced by
mechanization has often been cheap labor. If labor gets more
expensive, it is more likely to be economized and substituted for by
machines. Also inefficient industries, which have hitherto existed
solely by the exploitation of labor, may be put out of business when
the government sets minimum standards.32
Moreover, as Myrdal noted, the main selling point of the South in its
attempt to lure industry was its cheap labor.327 The FLSA partially
ruined this advantage, resulting in fewer opportunities for blacks in
Southern industry.3 28
C. The New Deal and the Creation of the "Underclass"
By the 1940s, it was apparent that despite New Deal relief measures
that benefited blacks disproportionately, the overall effect of the New
Deal on black workers was overwhelmingly negative.3 29 Most significant, New Deal labor policies helped cause a persistent increase in
black unemployment and thus contributed to the rise of the urban
underclass. 3 °
As late as 1934, proportionately more black workers than white
workers were employed.3 31 Never again would such a situation exist.
Significant disparities in white and black unemployment rates
occurred for the first time in the 1930s.3 2 In 1930, the ratio of

326. MYRDAL, supra note 302, at 397, 398.
327. MYRDAL, supra note 302, at 398.
328. MYRDAL, supranote 302, at 398. The harm done to Southern industry by minimum
wage laws has actually been a prime motivation for increases in the minimum wage. In a 1954
article, then-SenatorJohn F. Kennedy supported the minimum wage law as a way of protecting
businesses in New England from Southern competition. John F. Kennedy, New England and the
South: The Strugg for Industy, ATLANTiC MoNTHLYJan. 1954, at 32, 33 (noting that South has
many natural advantages over North and that minimum wage balances these advantages).
329. See VAN DEUSEN, supra note 41, at 117 ("The New Deal Program, affecting interest in
those who are 'ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed,' has done little to aid (the black] population.
Indeed, the Negro has actually lost under most of the New Deal measures.").
330. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing rise of underclass).
331. Karson & Radosh, supra note 271, at 163.
332. HILL, BLACK LABoR, supra note 17, at 96.
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black to white unemployment was 92:100; in 1940, it was 118:100; in
1949, it was 160:100; by 1954, it was 2:1... and has remained that
334

way.

A variety of factors caused this decline in black employment, most
of which are related to New Deal legislation. The Agricultural
Adjustment Acts (AAAs)33 ' accelerated the mechanization of farms,
throwing hundreds of thousands of unskilled black farm workers into
the labor market. 3 6 The Fair Labor Standards Act had the negative
effects Myrdal predicted,3 7 creating unemployment and making it
particularly difficult for black farmers left unemployed by the AAAs
to find unskilled work.3 1 In 1940, before the effects of minimum
wage laws were felt fully, white unemployment was 1.1 times as high
as black unemployment in the South. 39 By 1950, it was fifty-nine
percent as high, and it remained that way in 1960.' Similar effects
M ' Employment of black
occurred in other regions of the country."
teenagers, a prime indicator of their future access to the economic
mainstream, dropped from sixty percent in 1956 to thirty percent in
M2
1977 because of increased minimum wage rates and coverage."
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate for white teens remained
stable.3 43
The Wagner Act harmed blacks economically not only by granting
monopoly power to racist unions,34 but also by making it illegal for
employers to use blacks as strike-breakers or "strike insurance" and by
taking away blacks' ability to underbid white union labor.S Moreover, in response to above-market wages demanded by unions,
333.

RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOwELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND

GOVERNMENT IN TwENTIETH CENTuRYAMERICA 8 (tbl. 1.3) (1993); Bonacich, Advanced Capitalism,
supranote 293, at 34.
334. James J. Heckman &J. Hoult Verkerke, RacialDisparity and Employment Discrimination
Law: An Economic Perspectiv 8 YALE L.& POL'Y REv. 276, 282 (1990).
335. E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (1988).
336. RALPHJ. BUNCHE, THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO INTHE AGE OF FDR 610 (1973)
(noting that Agriculture Adjustment Act (AAA) was particularly disastrous for black sharecroppers); see also HARRIS, supra note 111, at 100-01; SrTKOFF, supra note 239, at 52-54; WOLTERS,
NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION, supranote 236, at 33-34.
337. See supratext accompanying notes 326-28.
338. Bunche, supra note 336, at 610.
339. Demsetz, supra note 319, at 288.
340. Demsetz, supra note 319, at 288.
341. Demsetz, supra note 319, at 288.
342. REYNOLDS, supra note 311, at 143; see Keyes, supra note 322, at 402 (observing that
before minimum wage increased dramatically in 1961, black youths had lower unemployment
rate than white youths in same age bracket, but after wage increase, "the black youth
unemployment rate... increased to the extent that it is now a multiple of the white youth
unemployment rate").
343. REYNOLDS, supranote 311, at 143.
344. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
345. Bonacich, Advanced Capitalsm,supra note 293, at 45.
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employers relocated part of the industrial process overseas and
mechanized, thereby eliminating unskilled labor jobs often held by
blacks.'
The unions expended their resources mainly in protecting skilled, predominantly white workers from these trends.' 7 In
other words, the Act equalized white and black wages for the samejob
but also drove up the price of black labor. Consequently, black
industrial workers were replaced by machines and cheaper foreign
labor, thus creating a class of perennial unemployed in the inner
city. 8 In sum, New Deal labor legislation contributed to a significant, persistent increase in black unemployment, which is identified
by William Julius Wilson and other sociologists as the leading cause
of the hopelessness, despair, family breakdown, and isolation from
mainstream society that defines the underclass. 9
D. Apologie for the New Deal
Given the facts noted above, the celebratory tone used in describing
the relationship between New Deal jurisprudence and black welfare3" seems unjustified. It is true that in some sense the acquiescence of the Supreme Court to the New Deal paved the way for the
federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s by significantly increasing
federal power. Several problems, however, deserve further attention.
First, the ultimate use of federal power on behalf of blacks resulted
from an accident of history. Viewed from a 1930s perspective, it was
far more likely that federal power would have been used against
blacks than in their favor. 1 The intervention of World War II, the

346. Bonacich, Advanced Capitalim,supranote 293, at 47; Keyes, supra note 322, at 400.
347. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against
Discrimination: A Reply to ProfessorSovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 850 (1967). Even the United
Mine Workers, one of the most racially progressive unions, followed this policy. NORTHRUP,
supra note 46, at 159-71.
348. Herbert R. Northrup, Equal Opportunity andEqual Pay, in THE NEGRO AND EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNrIY 85, 87 (Herbert R. Northrup & Richard L. Rowan eds., 1965); see Bonacich,
Advanced Capitalism, supra note 293, at 49 (noting that artificially high minimum wage laws led
to mechanization that ultimately led to unemployment for relatively unprotected black workers).
349. See WILIAMJ. WILSON, THE TRuLY DISADVANTAGED 1-5 (blaming rise of underclass on
disappearance of unskilledjobs from urban areas); supranote 22 (discussing rise of underclass);
cf Hill, Race and Organzed Labor, supranote 17 (blaming racial practices of organized labor for
.permanent condition of poverty and social disorganization" in black community). But cf
MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES' LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS

(1993) (blaming rise of underclass on cultural factors).
350. Se&,e.g., Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw,
99 YALE LJ. 453, 486515 (1989) (praising "creative" way New Dealers were able to change traditional preservationism
in Supreme Court).
351. See, e.g., supranotes 203-16 and accompanying text (discussing racist legislative history
of Davis-Bacon Act). See generally ROCHE, supranote 40, at 85-87 (noting that black political
organizations, such as NAACP, still had few resources); WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE DEPRESSION,
supra note 236, at 169-93 (noting that while blacks had made some political progress by late
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Cold War, and the great migration of blacks to Northern cities, the
most important events leading to the triumph of the civil rights
movement,"' could not have been anticipated by the justices of the
1937 Supreme Court. Without those factors, the rise of an activist
Federal Government could have led to political disaster for blacks,
instead of the victories of the civil rights movement.
Second, assuming arguendo that the New Deal was a "but-for" cause
of the successes of the civil rights movement, the continuing negative
repercussions of the New Deal on the black community should not be
neglected. As has been shown, New Deal labor legislation took away
many traditional advantages that black workers held in the labor
market while giving them little civil rights protection.3 53 While
many blacks have benefited significantly from civil rights employment
laws, particularly those pertaining to state and quasi-state action, 5 4
such laws have done little to help the class of permanently unemployed black men that the New Deal created. 55
Third, while a strengthened Federal Government may have been a
prerequisite to the establishment of strong civil rights legislation, such
a government could have arisen in the 1930s without the Federal
Government cartelizing the labor movement at the expense of blacks.
Simply because the New Deal had some unintended long-run positive

1930s, and had some friends in Roosevelt administration, their general lack of political power
is demonstrated by their inability to have much influence on course of New Deal legislation);
Demsetz, supra note 319, at 202 (asserting that until early 1960s all major legislation that
interfered with free market and proved to be politically palatable worsened economic well-being
of blacks).
352. The European campaign of World War II was fought, at least rhetorically, in response
to the racism of Nazi Germany, which made domestic racism seem like an anomaly. The war
also created an egalitarian spirit across the country. J. R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALrlY IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 256 (1978). The Cold War, and the accompanying competition for the
hearts and minds of new Third World nations, made the end of officially sanctioned racism in
the United States a foreign policy imperative. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative 41 STAN. L REv. 61, 62 (1988). Perhaps most important, the migration of blacks
from the South to cities in large industrial states created an electoral power whose votes were
of crucial importance, particularly in the critical and close presidential election of 1960. See
'God's Southern Gentleman', NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1984, at 48, 48 (noting importance of black vote
to Kennedy's election in 1960).
353. Seesupranotes243-87 and accompanying text (discussing deleterious effects of New Deal
labor legislation); see also HILL, BLACK LABOR, supra note 17, at 96-97 (noting that while blacks
were losing jobs because of racial bias in New Deal programs, they were also being excluded
from programs seeking to stabilize economy).
354. SeegenerallyRIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992) (opposing civil rights laws
as applied to private employers but acknowledging importance of, and need for, legal restraints
on discriminatory behavior of government and private businesses granted monopoly powers by
government).
355. Winter, supra note 347; cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Paradoxof Civil Rights, 8 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 299, 312 (1990) (arguing that title VII, as applied to private employers, has left blacks
in worse condition by driving firms out of black communities and into white areas to prevent
suits alleging discrimination in employment).
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effects is no reason to absolve its creators from responsibility for its
negative effects.
Finally, the celebration of the rise of the civil rights/welfare state
depends on a particular normative view of the proper role of
government in ensuring individual rights, and, indeed, of what
constitutes a "right" that should be enforced by government. As
Professor Bruce Ackerman notes, the Lochner era Supreme Court was
rapidly moving to a synthesis in which it guaranteed liberty of contract
to all, regardless of race or gender.356 Moreover, the Court was
clearly moving in the direction of a more general equal protection
jurisprudence. 57 It is possible to imagine that but for the interruption of the Great Depression and the New Deal, entirely different
forms of civil rights protections would have arisen-a laissez-faire
combination of equal protection of the law, liberty of contract, and
freedom of association, instead of the more statist combination of
interest group liberalism, the welfare state, and government enforcement of nondiscrimination norms against private parties. While this
Article is not the place to defend or reject either system, it should be
noted that the laissez-faire version of civil rights was essentially the
philosophy of the Radical Republicans during
Reconstruction,358
3 59
and still has many forceful advocates today.
Apologists for the New Deal can thus be challenged on a variety of
grounds.
But however one ultimately weighs the New Deal
Revolution's effects on black welfare, those effects certainly were not
as uniformly positive as Panglossian scholars would have it.

356. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 101 (1991) ("[Bllacks no less
than whites, women no less than men, had been granted equal rights of property and control.")
As examples, Ackerman cites Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down
discriminatory minimum wage law for women) and Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(invalidating state-imposed housing segregation).
357. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (reversing conviction of"Scottsboro
Boys"); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932) (declaring whites-only primary election
unconstitutional); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536,540 (1927) (invalidating whites-only primary
election); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (striking down law banning
private schools run for benefit ofJapanese immigrants); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
533-36 (1925) (finding that law inspired by prejudice against Catholics requiring every parent
to send children to public school is "an unreasonable interference with ... liberty" and hence
unconstitutional).
358. For two works that describe the ideology of the Radical Republicans, see FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION supra note 8, and DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALrIY: LABOR AND THE
RADICAL REPuBLICANs 1862-72 (1967).
359. See,e.g., CLINT D. BOLICK, CHANGING COURSE: CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS 3-32
(1988); EPSTEIN, supra note 354, at 221-47; Roger Pilon, UncivilRights, REG., Summer 1991, at
9; Jennifer Roback, The Separationof Race and State, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 58 (1991).
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CONCLUSION

The growth of "progressive" national labor legislation in the 1930s
had devastating consequences for black Americans. Tens of thousands of blacks lost relatively well-paying positions in the railroad and
construction industries, and hundreds of thousands of others lost
unskilled positions permanently. It was no coincidence that the
growth of labor legislation harmed black workers. Interest groups, be
they organized labor or organized business, attempt to use the law to
obtain monopoly advantages at the expense of those with less political
power, and powerless minority groups are often victims of "rentseeking""t ° behavior by politicians and interest groups.3 61 Disenfranchised, politically vulnerable blacks were no match for racist labor
unions and their political sponsors in the 1930s.
The free hand that the judiciary gave to Congress and state
legislatures to enact laws regulating the labor market in the 1930s
continues to allow established businesses and workers to create
government-sponsored monopolies at the expense of unorganized,
politically powerless potential new entrants to the labor market, who
disproportionately are poor immigrants or persons of color. The
Davis-Bacon Act, for example, continues to discriminate against
unskilled workers, particularly blacks, while also inhibiting the ability
of small, often minority-owned contracting companies to obtain
government construction contracts. 62 The taxicab industry, which
once provided tens of thousands of opportunities for small-scale
entrepreneurs, is now dominated by large-scale enterprises holding
exclusive government franchises. 33 Licensing laws allow organized
groups of workers to restrict new entrants, while often contributing
little to public health and safety."t

360. SeeCASSR. SUNSTEIN,AFrERTHERIGHTSREVOLUTION'70 (1990) (defining"rentseeking"
as "the dissipation of wealth through efforts to redistribute resources by way of politics"). See
generally Robert Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 575-80 (1982) (providing survey
of literature on rent-seeking).
361. See generalyJenniferRoback, Pluralbut Equak Group Identity and Voluntay Integration, 8
SOC. PHIL. & POLY 60 (1991) (likening integration to market good that people may choose or
reject and proposing that ethnic groups abandon struggle to control government and instead
adopt race neutral laws for common good);Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON.
INQUIRY 661, 671-73 (1989) (describing political incentive to redistribute wealth from vulnerable
minority groups).
362. Bernstein, supranote 216.
363. SeeWALTER E. WIujMs, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS 75-87 (1982) (noting that in effort
to limit number of taxicabs, government only issues limited number of licenses, causing price
of licenses to increase such that people with limited means were priced out of market).
364. WALTER GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT RESTRAiNT 105-51 (1968).
For several discussions of the negative effects of licensing laws on minority achievement, see
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Because of these and other continuing abuses, liberal scholars such
as Laurence Tribe and Leonard Levy, as well as conservatives such as
Justice Clarence Thomas, favor stricter judicial scrutiny of laws
The Supreme Court has even
restricting economic opportunity"
noted, albeit in a footnote, that "[i]t requires no argument to show
that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of ... personal freedom.""
Broad resistance to stricter review of economic regulation continues,
however, because of memories of the alleged excesses of the Lochner
era. In particular, it is still alleged that past judicial review of
occupational regulation "benefitted established economic interests at
the expense of the relatively powerless." 6 '
The facts presented in this Article demonstrate that this criticism
reflects the fact that the history of the Lochner era has been written
mainly by scholars who fail to recognize that during that era, native
white male workers were themselves an established economic interest
group who sought to use the power of the state to monopolize the
labor market at the expense of relatively powerless blacks and
others." Labor legislation, not its invalidation, was the major tool

CENTER FOR PUBuC REPRESENTATION, REGULATING OCCUPATIONS:

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO

LICENSING EXAMINATIONS IN WISCONSIN 9, 17 (1988); Stuart Dorsey, OccupationalLicensing and
Minorities, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 171, 171-72 (1983); Stuart Dorsey, The OccupationalLicensing
Queue, 15J. HUM. RESOURCES 424, 424-33 (1980).
365. See TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1373-74 (observing importance of preserving economic
choices); id. at 1378 (noting that government should "not take away without clear and focused
justification ... a fair opportunity for an individual to realize her identity in a chosen
vocation"); Leonard W. Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 169, 169 (1988)
(criticizing Supreme Court's ruling in New Orleansv. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), as limiting
one's ability to secure livelihood); Clarence Thomas, Address at the Pacific Forum of the Pacific
Research Institute (Aug. 10, 1987) (calling for return to principles of natural law, including right
to earn from one's labor).
366. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.23 (1976) (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 41 (1915)).
367. MichaelJ. Phillips, AnotherLookAtEconomicSubstantiveDueProcess,1987 Wis. L. REv. 265,
275.
368. See David E. Bernstein, Note, The Supreme Court and "CivilRights," 1886-1908, 100 YALE
UJ. 725, 733-42 (1990) (describing role of labor legislation in harming economic interests of
blacks, women, and immigrants).
It will be argued that white workers nevertheless possessed less bargaining power than their
employers. In a free labor market, however, wages will tend to rise to marginal productivity.
While labor legislation can raise wages, even in a regulated labor market an employer will not
pay an employee more than that employee produces. The major effect of labor legislation,
therefore, is to reduce the supply of labor, increasing the wages for some at the expense of
unemployment for others. LUDwIG VON MIsES, HUMAN ACTION 617 (3d ed. 1963); cf. VEDDER
& GALLAWAY, supranote 333, at 285 (applying this principle to rise in unemployment in United
States). Certain workers (generally those whose organizations had a voice in creating the
legislation) gain, while others lose. See, eg., Charles Brown et al., TheEffect of the Minimum Wage
on Employment and Unemployment 20 J. ECON. LIrERATURE 487, 489-508 (1982) (discussing
distributive effects of minimum wage law). In the case of the labor legislation discussed in this
Article, many white workers gained, while most black workers lost.
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of oppression of workers during the Lochner era.
That is not to say that every economic regulation passed during the
Lochner era, or extant today, cannot pass constitutional muster.
Judicial activism on behalf of occupational liberty, like any other form
of judicial activism, undoubtedly has its potential pitfalls, including
potential judicial overreaching. But many of those pitfalls can be
avoided if courts would focus on opposing monopolistic legislation.
Indeed, a return to Lochner and substantive due process is not
necessarily required in order for occupational liberty to be judicially
protected.36 9
At least some reassessment of the near-total judicial abandonment
of its obligation to protect occupational liberty is in order. The right
to pursue an occupation free from unwarranted government
interference on behalf of special interest groups is an important
traditional American liberty,37 an important human right,371 and,
as the historical example of blacks during the New Deal era shows, an
imperative if those without a strong voice in the political system are
to be given an opportunity to pursue the "American Dream."

While the Lochner era Supreme Court struck down legislation benefiting unionized labor at
the expense of nonunion labor, it did not strike down legislation that merely redistributed
income from rich to poor. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Reations: A Critique of
the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE LJ. 1357, 1362-63 n.17 (1983); see also SEMONCHE, supra
note 7, at 430-31 (noting that Court upheld "remedial" labor legislation, but not legislation
benefiting unions).
369. The Supreme Court could, for example, rethink its 1943 holding that federal antitrust
regulation cannot be applied to state-created monopolies. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
351 (1943) (holding that Sherman Act was not intended to restrain state action).
370. Cf Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-house Cases Re-examined, 31 EMoRY LJ. 785, 789 (1982) (discussing traditional right
to be free from government-sponsored monopoly).
371. Levy, supranote 365, at 183 ("With the exception of freedom of religion, nothing is
more important than work and a chance at a career or a decent living.").

